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NOMENCLATURE
ACTIVE/STANDBY: Redundant actuator configuration that utilizes one
actuator channel at a time. The active actuator
controls the output, until deactivated, and then a
standby actuator is activated to drive the output
(para. 2.2.2.2.).
BLOCKING VALVE: Two-position valve (open or closed) which functions
to pass or block hydraulic fluid flow (para. 2.4).
BYPASS VALVE: See blocking valve.
CASCADE FAILURE: A domino failure effect, e.g., failure of a correctly-
operating actuator channel caused by the failure of
another actuator channel.
CENTERING DETENT: A preloaded spring force which forces the system
output to a specific position (para. 2.2.2.4).
COMPLIANCE: Deflected motion of an element as a function of
force, i.e., the inverse of stiffness (para. 2.2.2.3).
COOPER-HARPER: A method for rating aircraft flying qualities. A rating
(PILOT RATING) of 1.0 is highly desirable and 10.0 indicates major
deficiencies (fig. 37).
CROSS-CHANNEL A failure monitoring scheme that compares each
MONITORING: actuator channel against another actuator channel.
DUAL FAIL-OPERATIVE: Capable of operating after sustaining two malfunc-
tions (para. 2.4.1).
DEADBAND: Lack of response to low level command signals
(fig. 11).
EQUALIZATION: A method to reduce force fight in a force summed
system (para. 2.2.2.3).
FAIL-OPERATIONAL: Capable of operating after sustaining a malfunction
(para. 2.4.1).
FLIGHT CRITICAL: Essential for continued safe flight.
FORCE SUMMING: A parallel active mechanization where two or more
actuators are connected to a common output and
operate simultaneously. (para. 2.2.2.2).
xv
HANDLING QUALITIES: Qualities or characteristics of an aircraft that govern
the ease and precision with which a pilot is able to
perform the tasks required in support of an aircraft
role (fig. 37).
iHARDOVER: 100% signal or position output. A hardover failure
indicates that an actuator has been driven to its stops.
HIGH GAIN FAILURE: System response to an input command at a higher
than designed (normal) gain. Usually caused by an
open feedback loop (para. 3.4.1.4).
HYSTERESIS: The difference in the input command signal required
to produce the same output position during a single
cycle of input throughout a specified range when
cycled at a rate below that at which dynamic effects
are significant (fig. 11).
IN-LINE MONITORING: A failure monitoring scheme to detect failures within
a redundant actuator channel without voting what
the other channels are doing.
LOAD SHARING: The working together of force summed actuators
(para. 2.2.2.3).
MINIMUM-SAFE OPERATION: Pilot rating greater than 6.5, based on Cooper-Harper
scale, indicating aircraft handling qualities having
major deficiencies (para. 3.3.3.2).
NORMAL OPERATION: Pilot rating less than 3.5, based on Cooper-Harper
scale, indicating aircraft handling qualities with satis-
factory characteristics. (para. 3.3.3.2).
OSCILLATORY FAILURE: An oscillating system response to a faulty signal
(para. 3.4.1.4).
PARALLEL ACTIVE: A redundant actuator configuration with two or more
actuators operating simultaneously to drive a
common output (para. 2.2.2.2).
PASSIVE FAILURE: No system response to an input command. This is
commonly caused by an open input signal path
(para. 3.4.1.4).
PILOT RATING: See Cooper-Harper.
xvi
POSITION SUMMING: A parallel active mechanization where two or more
actuators are summed through differential linkage.
The output is the sum of the individual actuator
output positions (para. 2.2.2.2).
SLOWOVER FAILURE: A system response to an erroneous ramp signal,
usually until it reaches a fully extended or retracted
position (para. 3.4.1.4).
STEP FAILURE: A system response to an erroneous step signal. The
extreme step failure is a hardover failure.
(para. 3.4.1.4).
THRESHOLD: The minimum input signal amplitude necessary to
produce a measureable change in the output position
(fig. 11).
VELOCITY SUMMING: A parallel active mechanization, where two or more
actuators are summed through differential gearing.
The system output is the sum of the individual
actuator output velocities.
-3 dB CUTOFF FREQUENCY: The frequency at which the system amplitude
response is down 3 dB.
xvii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Economically and competitively viable commercial aircraft of the future will have to take
advantage of all possible gains in aerodynamic efficiency and weight reduction in order to
improve fuel utilization, operating costs, and performance. Utilization of advanced
technology flight control concepts will significantly contribute to the successful achieve-
ment of these gains.
The flight control systems of modern advanced aircraft are necessarily becoming complex
and increasingly difficult to design and implement as more demands for added control
functions, increased performance and operational capabilities, improved economics, and
greater safety reliability and survivability are made. Furthermore, these advanced flight
control systems require the integration of complex hydraulic actuators and electronic
control systems. These design integrations are not easily realized due to implementation
requirements and techniques. The associated implementation problems require careful
attention to successfully develop the required advanced technology flight controls for
aircraft of the future.
This report presents the results of a quantitative study of two different actuator redundancy
mechanization concepts that provide a fail-operational capability suitable for use in
flight-critical control applications. This is the final report of Contract NAS2-7966, Mod.
No. 3, Redundant Actuator Development Program. This contract study is the second phase
of a program at NASA-ARC to develop and broaden the technology base of flight-critical
flight control systems for the next generation of advanced technology commercial jet
transport aircraft.
Section 2.0 contains a summary of the study's purpose, approach, results, and conclusions,
the configurations studied, and recommendations for future developments.
Section 3.0 contains the study's ground rules and requirements. This section also describes
the detailed approach and techniques, the detailed test and analysis procedure used, and the
design tradeoff studies conducted in arriving at the final actuator configuration definitions.
The results of the quantitative study are also contained and presented in this section.
Section 4.0 contains the final definition and specification of the two actuator concepts
studied.
Section 5.0 discusses the applicability of the actuation concepts to advanced supersonic
transport control systems as well as the applicability to other types of aircraft control
systems.
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2.0 SUMMARY
2.1 STUDY PURPOSE AND APPROACH
The Boeing Company has completed a study of flight control system redundancy
mechanization applicable to aircraft requiring fail-operational control. This report presents
the results of a quantitative evaluation of two different actuator redundancy mechanization
concepts that provide a fail-operational capability suitable for use in flight-critical control
applications.
With the present state-of-the-art in hydraulic and electronic components, adequate safety
cannot be guaranteed for flight-critical items on a single-channel basis. Redundancy
therefore is required, which leads to additional complexity. The number of redundant
channels required depends to a great extent on the method of mechanization.
Two methods of actuator redundancy mechanization representative of those most likely to
be used in future airplanes have been studied to provide a quantitative assessment of design
application to an Advanced Supersonic Transport (AST) airplane. The two actuator
configurations studied were a four-channel, force summed system and a three-channel,
active/standby system.
The study approach in producing a quantitative evaluation of the two actuator concepts was
to (1) establish allowable actuation system operating characteristics based on a piloted
evaluation of airplane handling qualities, (2 ) determine and evaluate, by analysis, the
actuation system operating characteristics and configuration-sensitive parameters, and
(3 ) quantitatively compare the two concepts relative to safety, reliability, maintainability,
vulnerability, weight, and cost.
2.2 STUDY BASELINE CONFIGURATION
Producing a quantitative evaluation of alternative actuator concepts necessitated the
selection of an appropriate baseline airplane type and configuration, a representative control
system configuration, and equivalent actuator system configurations. This section establishes
and describes the baseline configurations used in this study.
2.2.1 CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS
In the last few years, emphasis in new airplane configurations has mainly been directed
towards improving economy and efficiency. Increasing reliability and safety, containing or
reducing airfield lengths, enhancing flying qualities, and reducing noise and pollution.
In the past, feedback control systems have been instrumental in improving handling
qualities, reliability, and safety. The first applications were in autopilots, implying control
of aircraft attitude to relieve the pilot on long stretches. Later, stability augmentation
control became widely used, inferring better handling and smoother riding aircraft. More
recently, feedback control systems with greater authority have been used to achieve precise
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control when the pilot could not adequately accomplish the task, such as in landing
approach in poor visibility (e.g., autoland control). Although a hardover failure command in
a low-authority system can be tolerated since the pilot can override and switch it off,
hardovers in large-authority systems can lead to loss of control and catastrophe. It is
necessary to safeguard against such failures by multiplexing control channels to identify and
ov,,e-A faulty channel,.
An alternate approach to past practices associated with airframe designs is to configure the
vehicle to take full advantage of the benefits of augmentation. Augmentation, as used in this
context, is not restricted only to improvement of handling qualities but includes
improvement of a variety of characteristics such as ride qualities, load alleviation, flutter
suppression, performance, and any other area in which a benefit can be gained. The basic
difference in this approach is that the configuration of the vehicle is dependent on the
impact that the control system makes on the design. The flight control system then becomes
as important as structure with respect to flight safety, and therefore the matter of system
reliability and redundancy are a paramount concern.
2.2.1.1 Airplane Configuration
The purpose of this AST-funded study was to produce a quantitative assessment of the
actuation-system design application to an AST airplane. To conduct this study a
representative advanced airplane model, the Boeing 2707-300 SST, was selected as the
baseline airplane configuration.
The design development of the Boeing 2707-300 SST emphasized the achievement of an
optimum configuration arrangement from the standpoint of aerodynamic and structural
efficiency. Substantial improvements in weight, drag, and balance resulted from configuring
the airplane with the c.g. limit aft of the maneuver-neutral point at subsonic speeds and
sizing the longitudinal surface to meet control moment requirements rather than stability
requirements. The resulting unstable airplane had to be augmented through the flight
control system to provide acceptable handling qualities. This required incorporating a highly
reliable stability augmentation system (SAS) that would ensure at least minimum-safe
handling qualities. This minimum-safe SAS, being likened to basic structure, became known
as Hard SAS or HSAS. The design approach for HSAS was to specify the simplest possible
system that could assure at least minimum-safe handling qualities, to take all precautions to
optimize the reliability of the system during manufacture and service, and to minimize
maintenance requirements.
Normal handling qualities were provided by an outer loop system called an electrical
command and stability system (ECSS). This sytem was more complex than HSAS and used
more conventional packaging techniques.
Further, it was decided for the prototype SST airplane that when flight safety was
dependent on an augmentation system, safety would be ensured by another means, until the
reliability of the new design was proven in a true flight environment. This was accomplished
on the Boeing prototype SST by providing a mechanical backup control mode.
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The concept of dissimilar redundancy is significant in ensuring safety in aircraft control
system designs. The more the dissimilarity between alternative means of control, the less the
probability of a common failure mode or single failure event destroying all means of
control.
2.2.1.2 Flight Control Configuration
The 2707-300 longitudinal control system was selected as the baseline control system for
this study. The following considerations were pertinent to selecting the B2707-300 SST
pitch axis as the baseline:
1. Considerable effort and development had gone into evolving the B2707-300 airplane
and subsystems.
2. The B2707-300 SST is currently mechanized and modeled on the NASA-ARC motion
simulator.
3. The actuator study relates directly to the "Handling Qualities" portion of this same
contract study since critical flight configurations for the actuation system evaluation
study were determined from the handling qualities work.
2.2.1.3 Safety/Reliability Criteria
Safety is the primary purpose of the airworthiness requirement contained in Part 25 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations. These requirements must always be kept in mind, as they are
the standard by which airworthiness of the aircraft are judged. Besides the FAA regulations,
consideration must be given to the requirements imposed by other nations on aircraft
offered for sale within their jurisdiction. Among nations having specific airworthiness
requirements are the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and
Australia.
Existing regulations (FAR 25.21(e)) recognize that acceptable flight characteristics may
depend upon a stability augmentation system or upon other automatic or power-operated
systems.
With the present state-of-the-art in hydraulic and electronic components, adequate safety
cannot be guaranteed for flight critical items on a single-channel basis. The probability of
failure in a critical system must be extremely remote (extremely improbably) inferring that
total system failure rate must be less than 1 x 10-9 failures per flight hour. Electrohydraulic
systems on a single-channel basis demonstrate 1 x 10-3 to 1 x 104 failures per flight-hour
which falls far short of this goal. Redundancy, therefore, is required to make up this
difference, which leads to additional complexity. The number of redundant channels
required depends to a great extent on the techniques of mechanizing the system.
The required level of overall function reliability is achieved in control systems by increasing
redundancy for those functions that do not have the desired reliability. For example,
controllability of the latest generation of large jet transports is dependent on the integrity of
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the hydraulically powered controls. Reliability for safety of flight is provided by multiple
hydraulic systems. The ultimate levels of reliability are required only for those functions
needed for safe termination of flight.
2.2.2 CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS
The flight control systems of modern advanced aricraft are necessarily becoming complex
and increasingly difficult to design and implement as more demands are made for added
control functions, increased performance and operational capabilities, improved economics,
and greater safety and survivability. Future aircraft will have to take advantage of all
possible gains in aerodynamic efficiency and weight reduction with their impact on fuel
savings, operating costs, and performance improvements to be economically and competi-
tively viable. Advanced control requirements and advanced flight control system concepts,
involving complex hydraulic actuators and electronic control systems, are not easily realized
due to implementation techniques and associated problems. These problem areas require
careful attention in the development of advanced technology flight control and aircraft of
the future.
Reliability and safety requirements for flight-critical control systems that convert and
amplify flight control and stability augmentation commands to provide inputs to the
control surface power actuators are determined by the need to remain operational in spite
of control channel malfunctions. Actuation systems with fault-corrective capability to meet
the reliability requirements and satisfy FAA regulations require at least four active channels
or three monitored channels. Although the minimum redundancy level for flight-critical
surface power actuators is three, surface power actuators could be mechanized with the
higher level of redundancy.
To meet these levels of reliability, special consideration must be given to the control system
design. Such considerations include design simplification, derating of components, elimina-
tion of electrical connectors, and physical isolation of electrical wiring and hydraulic power.
Even then, redundancy is usually required to obtain satisfactory reliability from the
complex hydraulic actuators and electronic control systems used in airplane flight controls.
Use of redundancy to achieve reliability has always been an accepted engineering design
technique. However, the advantages of redundancy are not easily realized in control systems
because of signal channel interaction, failure effects, performance degradation after failures,
null shift with channel switching, and failure detection problems. These problem areas with
redundant control systems and actuators require careful attention in system design and
mechanization.
2.2.2.1 Redundancy Requirements
Redundancy requirements for flight control actuation systems can be divided into two
areas, the requirement for flutter-free control surfaces, and the requirement for operative
flight-critical control surfaces.
The need to minimize airplane weight reduces the permissible use of control-surface mass
balance as a means of preventing control-surface flutter. If mass balance is not used, the
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surface must be restrained by the surface control system. The Federal Aviation Regulations,
volume III, part 25, paragraph 25.629, "Flutter deformation, and fail-safe criteria", requires
that an airplane be free from flutter after any single failure in the flight control system, plus
any other reasonably probable single failure or malfunction affecting flutter. Hydraulic
system failures are classified as reasonably probable by the FAA. Therefore, when the
airplane design dictates that control surfaces be restrained by the surface power actuators to
avoid the mass balance weight penalty, at least two surface power actuators and three
hydraulic systems for each surface are required.
Independent of considerations for suppression of surface flutter, surface power actuator
redundancy is influenced by the need to maintain control of the airplane flight path. The
Federal Aviation Regulations, volume III, part 25, paragraph 25.671, requires that the
airplane must be capable of safe flight and landing after any single failure, excluding
jamming, in combination with any probable hydraulic or electrical system failure.
One form of redundancy to assure continuance of a control function after failures would be
to use multiple-control surface segments, independently controlled, in each airplane axis.
Control-surface redundancy, when used for failure tolerance reasons, requires surface
oversizing so that the total authority exceeds the minimum requirement by some margin.
Otherwise, the whole philosophy of multiple surfaces is invalid. If actuator redundancy were
not required for prevention of flutter, each surface could be controlled by a single actuator.
Degraded, but safe, operation could be possible if one or more surface segments became
inoperative. This concept is used in some current airplanes. However, if the airplane design is
such that a limited number of flight control surfaces are available or if all control surfaces in
an axis are needed for flight path control, each surface must remain operative and
controllable after certain dual-control system failures.
Advanced supersonic cruise transport airplanes will probably be limited in the use of control
surface redundancy, particularly in the longitudinal axis, because of the need to attain
maximum aerodynamic efficiency. The need for minimum weight in an advanced supersonic
transport airplane will also limit the consideration of mass balance for flutter prevention.
These two factors are sufficient to set the minimum redundancy level for surface power
actuators and show the need for redundancy in flight control actuation systems.
The general approach to implementing a fail-operational control system is to use redundant
channels and to have a way of rejecting erroneous outputs. The problems of developing
fail-operational control systems can be separated into two interelated areas: (1) design of
the method for selecting an output from the redundant channels, and (2) design of the
method for detecting and deactivating a failed channel.
2.2.2.2 Actuation Redundancy
There are two distinct types of actuator redundancy used in aircraft control systems. One
type is the parallel-active configuration (fig. 1). The parallel-active configuration incorpo-
rates multiple channels which perform identical control functions simultaneously. The other
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type is the active/standby configuration (fig. 2), which incorporates multiple channels, only
one of which controls the output of the system at any one time. The principal differences
between the two types are as follows:
* The parallel-active technique requires the redundant control channels to be working
togpthr t some pnint in the control yste. ence, the falur , o one "
channels can cause an output performance change. For an active/standby system, the
control channels operate independently and failures of the active control channel cause
transfer to a correctly operating standby channel with no performance degradation.
* The parallel-active system requires all of the control channels to be working at the
same time. The failure of one channel is compensated for by the remaining correctly
operating channels (to varying degrees). Therefore, it is not necessary to immediately
deactivate the failed channel. In an active/standby system, rapid transfer between
control channels is essential (with the actual required transfer time-determined by the
particular application).
There are three options available in the mechanization of parallel-active actuator systems.
The control channels can be brought together and the actuator outputs summed by
(1) force summing, (2) velocity summing, or (3) position summing (fig. 1).
Force summing is the most common technique used in mechanizing parallel active systems.
By force voting several actuators on a common output, an output representing the mid-value
of all input commands can be achieved. One problem with this type of system that does not
exist with other types is the force fight that can occur between actuator channels when
channels differ in input command or actuator characteristics.
Velocity summing is an alternate parallel-active mechanization which does not incur the
force fight problems of the force summed systems. The best example of this mechanization
uses servo motors summed through differential gear boxes. Net output velocity is the sum of
the individual motor velocities and the force output is equal to the individual force ouLputs
of the servo motors.
Position summing systems have no actuator force fight. However, since the individual
actuators are summed through differential linkages, a channel failure or actuator shutdown
will reduce total output stroke capability. Each individual actuator must have a larger stroke
than the minimum allowable output stroke to accommodate channel failures. This
characteristic restricts the application of the position summing technique to systems that
require only small displacement. It has been used in dual systems for series actuation.
Mechanization becomes difficult when more than two actuators are summed because of
mechanism complexity.
2.2.2.3 Implementation Factors
There are several factors that must be considered when redundant actuators are used. The
most significant are those that affect normal operation, affect operation after failures, and
cause interface problems. These are failure insensitivity, failure monitoring, load sharing,
and input mismatch.
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Failure Insensitivity.-Failure insensitivity is the ability of a redundant control system to
experience failures and automatically continue operation with an acceptable transient. If the
system performs a critical function, operation must be maintained (be fail-operational) in
the presence of one or more failures. However, a fail-operational system does not ensure
minimum control-system transients. The criticality of transients has an effect on the detail
design of the system. All the methods of redundancy mechanization previously discussed
can be fail-operational. However, the number of channels required and the failure
characteristics vary as in the following discussion.
1. Fail-operational capability can be achieved in parallel-active systems by majority voting
or averaging three or more active actuators. With three active channels, operation
continues after the first failure. With four channels, operation continues after two
failures, if the first failed channel has been deactivated before the second channel fails.
In the force-voted systems a failed channel is automatically overpowered by the
remaining channels and the magnitude of the failure transient can be insignificant.
Displacement and velocity summing provide an averaged output but have inherent
failure transients and steady state null offsets after failures. The magnitudes of the
transients are dependent on the system's closed loop response.
2. Active/standby systems require a failure detection system to assess that the active
channel has failed, automatically disconnect it, and switch to a good channel. The
failure transient is dependent upon the failure detection level, the switching time, and
the tracking of the standby channel.
Failure Monitoring.-Detection and indication of failures during operation must be provided
so that failed channels or actuators can be deactivated to preserve the integrity of the
system. The failure detection system must be designed to detect all types of failures;
hardover, passive, oscillatory, and slowover or ramp which could produce an unsafe
situation.
The ability of the failure detection system to sort out legitimate failures from apparent
failures that might occur due to adverse tolerances has an equivalence in reliability. If the
failure detection system trips a channel off inadvertently due to an apparent failure, the
equivalent mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) for the system may be significantly affected.
Failures in parallel-active systems may be sensed by in-line monitoring of actuator
characteristics or by cross-channel monitoring between active acuators. A method of
reducing the number of redundant actuators is to use a model of a working channel for
cross-channel monitoring. While this extends the system's fail-operational capability with
one less working channel, its effectiveness depends on how well the model matches the
actual hardware. In certain applications, where actuators are large and where weight is
critical, the model approach may provide a way to minimize overall weight.
In active/standby systems each channel must be individually monitored for failure
detection. Each control channel is usually duplicated or modeled to provide the comparison
required to detect a failure of the active channel.
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Load Sharing.-Load sharing is a measure of the ability of multiple actuators with identical
inputs to work together in positioning a common output. Load sharing is a problem peculiar
to force summed actuators since, obviously there is no force fighting in an active/standby
system with only one channel controlling at a time, or in position summed and rate summed
systems where forces of individual actuator channels are additive.
Ideally, it is desirable that the load be divided equally among redundant actuators to
eliminate any force fighting. However, tracking errors arise due to tolerance buildup in each
actuator servo loop and actuator installation that tend to make each actuator seek a unique
position, even though the input commands are identical. With the actuators tied to a
common output all position commands will not be simultaneously satisfied and force fights
will occur between actuators.
To minimize the force fighting in force summed actuator configurations and assure
acceptable sharing of the load, four methods are commonly used.
1. Accurate tolerance control of the actuator feedback loop: A mechanical actuator can
be mechanized with good tolerance control because of the manufacturing accuracies
that are possible and the unchanging nature of the mechanical linkages. In contrast, an
electrically controlled actuator has command path elements such as summing
amplifiers, demodulators, and feedback transducers which can change characteristics
with time, temperature, and power. It is generally accepted that the tolerances
associated with an electrically controlled actuator are significantly greater than for a
mechanically controlled actuator.
2. Compliance between channels: In some applications the structural compliance
between actuators allows sufficient individual actuator position difference to reduce
force fights through the normal position feedback loop.
3. Low force gain actuators: Low pressure gain servovalves can be used to reduce the
force fight resulting from expected valve command differences to an acceptable level.
In some applications a feedback path consisting of deflections of the actuators'
reaction structure is sufficient to provide the actuator force gain reduction, and
reduced force fight. Another way to reduce actuator force gain is to use actuator load
pressure as a feedback command. However, there is a limit to the amount of
compliance that can be tolerated without reducing the overall actuator stiffness below
a minimum allowable level. Reducing actuator force gain (stiffness) has been used
successfully where inputs are reasonably matched, such as multiple surface power
actuators signalled by a common mechanical command, or secondary actuators where
the output load is small.
4. Equalization to average load: For cases where the actuators are required to operate
into large aerodynamic loads and have uncontrolled input mismatch, any pressure
feedback system requires modification to be useful. The individual actuator load must
be compared to the average load. Computation of the average load and the individual
difference from average requires cross-channel comparison. This method does not
degrade actuator stiffness but adds complexity 'and introduces the possibility of
cross-channel failures.
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Input Mismatch.-Differences in commands (input mismatch) due to tolerances in the
electrical control system, from sensor to actuator, can be quite high. As much as a quarter
of full-scale command can result unless some design precautions are taken to prevent such
buildup. It should be noted that differences in commands generated by actuator loop
tolerances are generally an order of magnitude less than those generated by computational
elements in the upstream portions of the system. The various methods of redundant
actuator mechanization that deal with the input mismatch problem are as follows.
1. Force summing systems: In force summing systems, the output is the mid value of all
input commands. The force fight that occurs due to input command mismatch can be
reduced by the same methods used to insure load sharing. In some applications the
only possible means of controlling input command differences may be through the use
of electronic signal command conditioning.
2. Velocity summing systems: Velocity summed actuators allow the individual channels
to cancel command differences by differentially summing rates.
3. Position summing systems: Position summed actuators accommodate command
differences by producing a single output which is the average of the input commands.
4. Active/standby systems: Usually the active actuator is commanded by a single
electronic channel and mismatch is no concern during operation. Mismatches between
the commands of the active and the standby channel are of concern, however, and
must be minimized to avoid large transients upon switching from active to standby
actuators.
2.2.2.4 System Mechanization Concepts
The concept of using multiple channels of similar control information is generally applied
by utilizing some form of summing or decision process prior to the control surface, thus
bringing the various signal paths together to form a common command. Surface actuator
input signals can be either electrical or mechanical, or both.
The power levels associated with the electronic signals for fly-by-wire command, autopilot,
and stability augmentation systems are kept at low levels as a matter of good design. These
low-level signals are required to command surface actuators that operate at high power
levels. To transform the low-level electrical commands to surface displacements controlled
by large hydraulic power actuators requires signal conversion and amplification. This is
normally achieved using small electrically signalled hydraulic servo actuators as one of the
stages of amplification to form a mechanical consolidation prior to the surface power
actuators. These small actuators are termed secondary actuators (figs. 3 and 4).
It is advantageous to treat the command computation and signalling errors independently
from the power actuation errors through the use of the secondary actuator. Some of the
advantages are:
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" The secondary actuator can become a synchronizing stage between the two functions
by providing a single-valued mechanical command.
* Although secondary actuators do not eliminate the problems of redundant actuators,
the magnitude of the problems are less severe because the secondary actuators operate
at signnifi Jantar lorr fr, I lvls t1 1th surface power -actuators.
* When surface power actuators are isolated from the upstream command differences,
the task of providing adequate power actuator load sharing becomes easier, permitting
a simpler and more reliable mechanization.
A major concern in developing a system concept is determining the best way to interface the
system components and control modes. One of the more important decisions in establishing
the skeleton of the actuation system concept is to determine how the mechanical control
path and the redundant electronic control paths are to be mechanized.
Considerable trade studies for this design decision were made during the Boeing B2707-300
SST development. In considering all the disadvantages and advantages of the alternative
schemes, a summing interface method was selected. Although more complex, the summing
interface allowed continued control of the surface through the mechanical path if a jam
occurs in the secondary actuator output mechanism (fig. 3).
The summing concept requires a centering detent (to ground) to ensure adequate control of
the surface actuation system via the mechanical backup control after complete loss of
electrical control. These detent springs can be either engaged continuously or engaged only
after an electrical or hydraulic failure has occurred in a channel. If engaged continuously,
the detents would act like nuisance loads to the secondary actuators in normal operation. At
the expense of a slight increase in complexity, the detent springs could be caged (locked
out) in normal operation, and then engaged only after a failure in that channel. This latter
approach has the advantage of eliminating the unwanted detent loads from normal
operation. This latter mechanization approach was selected for this study.
2.2.2.5 Actuation System Concept Selection
Four types of actuator redundancy have been discussed, i.e., force summed, velocity
summed, position summed, and active/standby. The benefits of using secondary actuators as
a means of signal conversion, signal amplification, and command path synchronization to
control the surface power control actuators have been discussed. Surface power actuators
are usually force summed mechanical input actuators. The system differences are in the
redundancy mechanization of the secondary actuators.
Although the use of velocity summing solves the problem of force fight there are
disadvantages which make this type of system a questionable candidate for future use in
critical flight control applications on civil aircraft. The complex gearing could make it
difficult to prove that jam-type failures would be extremely remote, as required by FAA
regulations. Also, for the same output force the electromechanical actuator is larger and
heavier than an equivalent electrohydraulic actuator.
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Position summed systems are difficult to mechanize for more than two redundant channels
because of the complex linkage required. In addition, the loss of rate and travel capability
after failure and the inherent output position transient that occurs with failure are
disadvantages.
The active/standby and the force summed systems have advantages and disadvantages that
must be considered in conjunction with the specific airplane and control system application.
Of the options discussed, initial studies under contract NAS2-7653, Redundant Actuator
Development Study (phase I), disqualified all but the force summed approach of the
parallel-active actuator systems and the active/standby approach for continued study.
The study reported in this document, under contract NAS2-7966, concentrates on
evaluating two secondary actuator mechanizations (force summed and active/standby). A
quantitative evaluation was made of these two mechanization concepts to determine their
operational and performance characteristics for normal conditions, for failure conditions,
and for variations in critical design parameters. The two actuation concepts studied are
shown schematically in figures 5 and 6. Functional diagrams of these concepts are shown in
figures 7 and 8. Functional descriptions, referring to these figures, of the concepts are
presented in paragraph 2.4.1.
2.3 PILOTED SIMULATION EVALUATION (FSAA)
A piloted motion simulator study was conducted on the flight simulator for advanced
aircraft (FSAA) at NASA-ARC. This piloted simulator study evaluated the interaction of
pilot, airplane, and control system. The purpose of this evaluation was to establish and
define the allowable limits of critical actuation system design parameters.
This section describes the baseline airplane and control system models used and the study
approach taken, and summarizes the major results and conclusions of the simulation study.
A more detailed presentation of the scope, background, test conditions, and study results is
contained in paragraph 3.3.
2.3.1 BASELINE AIRPLANE CONFIGURATION
The B2707-300 supersonic transport airplane was selected as the baseline airplane
configuration for this study. The four flight configurations selected as representative of the
B2707-300 flight envelope, and utilized as the test flight conditions during the FSAA testing
are listed as follows.
I. High speed cruise within normal operation boundary
2. High speed cruise within minimum-safe operation boundary
3. Landing approach within normal operation boundary
4. Landing approach within minimum-safe operation boundary.
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2.3.2 BASELINE CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The B2707-300 longitudinal control system was selected as the baseline control system for
this actuation study.
Th ym is s i holwn functionally in its entirety in figures 9 and 10, and represents the
system used in conducting the piloted simulation study. The secondary actuator (EC Servo)
functional block on these figures was modified consistent with the study.
The EC servo model was expanded sufficiently to represent the secondary actuator system
parameters critical to the definition and development of the secondary actuator concepts
under study. This model did not represent a specific secondary actuator configuration.
Rather, it consisted of linear filters, limiters, and time-dependent functions to allow
simulation of the secondary actuator characteristics of importance to this study. As such,
limitations on specific parameters were established to correlate with the Boeing based
(analog) simulation to produce a quantitative evaluation of the candidate actuator concepts
being studied.
Figure 11 shows a functional diagram of the EC servo used in the study. The system was
built around the existing EC servo model as indicated in the figure and was represented as
single channel.
2.3.3 STUDY REQUIREMENTS AND APPROACH
The objective of this evaluation study was to establish design criteria for the secondary
actuation system applicable to an AST flight-critical control system. These criteria were
established based on pilot evaluation of manually flying a simulated supersonic transport
airplane. A piloted motion simulation, using the FSAA at Ames, was used to investigate and
evaluate various secondary actuator parameter effects on airplane handling quality
characteristics.
The simulation study was organized and planned to produce (1) a control transient
evaluation to relate actuator transient variations with pilot rating, (2) a design parameter
evaluation to relate actuator performance variations with pilot rating, and (3) a determina-
tion of the allowable limits of critical actuation system design parameters.
The testing performed on the FSAA simulator was divided into two categories. The first
category evaluated the effects of different control system failure modes on airplane handling
qualities. The second category investigated the effects of variations of actuator design
parameters on airplane handling qualities. Each test category was evaluated at the four flight
conditions described in paragraph 2.3.1 which included operation at landing approach and
high speed cruise. The airplane configurations were chosen so that the handling qualities
bordered on the lower limits of normal and minimum-safe operation. At each combination
of airplane configuration and flight condition a test sequence was performed with changing
actuator characteristics, until clear trends in pilot ratings were established.
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The detailed test and evaluation procedures are presented and discussed in paragraph 3.3.
The handling qualities criteria used in evaluating the results of the piloted simulation tests
are as follows:
1. With the airplane in a normal handling qualities state (i.e., PR < 3.5), the airplane
handling qualities shall not degrade below a PR of 3.5 following a single probable
control system failure, and a PR of 6.5 following a second control system failure (i.e., a
probable failure plus any other failure).
2. With the airplane in a nominal minimum-safe handling qualities state (i.e., 4.5 < PR
< 6.5) and with a normal flight control system (i.e., no flight control system failures),
the airplane handling qualities following a single control system failure shall not
degrade below a PR of 7.
The method by which these criteria were applied to the test data is shown in figure 12.
2.3.4 MAJOR RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The test results of the FSAA evaluation are summarized in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents
the failure transient test results summary and table 2 presents the actuator design parameter
variations test results summary.
These tables contain data showing the maximum magnitude of allowable surface transients
for various types of failure modes and the maximum magnitude of allowable actuator
system nonlinearities. These data have been established from the pilot evaluation results
contained in figures 13 through 25 using the criteria of figure 12. Two sets of data are
shown in both table 1 and 2, one for the high-speed cruise flight condition and one for the
landing approach flight condition. Typically, at these two flight conditions the airplane was
evaluated at two levels of handling qualities; i.e., normal-operation handling qualities and
minimum-safe handling qualities. For the normal-operation handling qualities airplane, two
allowables are shown; i.e., for a first system failure and for a subsequent (second) system
failure. For the minimum-safe handling qualities airplane,only a first failure allowable was
established and is shown.
Table 1 contains the summary of allowable failure transients for step, oscillatory (for
constant frequency and for constant amplitude), and switching delay failure types. The
values shown in the table are horizontal stabilizer deflection angle in degrees.
Table 2 contains the summary of the maximum allowable magnitudes of actuator system
nonlinearities; specifically deadband, hysteresis, and threshold. Similar to table 1, the
allowable magnitudes shown are horizontal stabilizer deflection angle in degrees.
Figures 13 through 25 present the test data. These figures contain data plotted as pilot
rating (PR) versus either failure transient amplitude or actuator parameter variation. The
figures are further categorized in relation to flight conditions and airplane handling qualities.
Actuator step failures were found to be most critical during cruise. This is evident in
figure 13 where pilot rating appears very sensitive to step amplitude. At the high dynamic
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pressure associated with supersonic cruise, control sensitivity becomes large, resulting in
large load factor increments for small stabilizer surface deflections. Upsets caused by sudden
changes in stabilizer angle resulted in prolonged load factor oscillations.
During landing approach (fig. 14) step inputs proved most critical when they occurred
immediately prior to or during landing flare and in the wrong direction, that is, nose down.
An oscillatory failure at constant frequency, c = 1 Hz, appeared to be a nuisance failure
rather than serious hazard to the safety of the airplane (figs. 15 and 16). Although it rapidly
degraded the normal handling qualities characteristics of the airplane, large amplitudes (of
50% of maximum stabilizer deflection) were required before the handling qualities were
forced beyond the criteria limits. The cause of this is believed to be filtering effects that the
airplane inherently has at this frequency.
The second sequence of oscillatory failures evaluated the effects of frequency variation. In
figures 17 and 18 it is obvious that the airplane-pilot combination was extremely sensitive to
frequencies in the range of 0.1 Hz to 0.5 Hz. This observation would dictate that failures
within these boundaries should be avoided for all failure modes.
The switching delay tests were conducted to assess the effect of switching from an active to
a standby channel in an active/standby secondary actuator system. These tests were run
only at a landing approach flight condition. As is evident in figure 19, the airplane would
sustain large switching delays before handling qualities boundaries were exceeded.
Figures 20 through 25 contain the test results of the actuator design parameter testing.
The test results indicate that the airplane configuration having baseline minimum-safe
handling qualities generally appears more sensitive to variations in parameter magnitude
than does the configuration having baseline normal handling qualities. The one exception to
this observation is shown in figure 20. Also, the airplane displays greater sensitivity to
parameter variations at high-speed cruise than it does for low-speed operations, such as
landing approach.
Figures 20 and 21 show the effect of deadband. The high speed cruise data of figure 20
show a greater sensitivity to deadband than the landing approach data of figure 21.
Furthermore, contrary to a general trend, the high-speed cruise normal-operation airplane
was more sensitive to deadband than was the minimum-safe handling qualities airplane.
Figures 22 and 23 show the effect of hysteresis. The normal-operation airplane at high-speed
cruise and landing approach had about the same sensitivity to variations in hysteresis.
However, the minimum-safe high-speed flight condition was considerably more sensitive
than the minimum-safe landing approach flight condition.
Figures 24 and 25 show the effect of threshold. Both the minimum-safe and normal-
operation airplane had similar trends with the high-speed cruise flight condition being more
sensitive to variations in threshold than the landing approach flight condition.
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2.4 ACTUATION CONCEPT COMPARISON EVALUATION
The two actuator concepts were developed and evaluated to produce a quantitative
comparison. Included in this section are detailed descriptions of the concepts, requirements
and study approach of the comparison evaluation study, and major results and conclusions
of this study phase. A more detailed presentation of the trade study is included in
paragraph 3.4.
The active/standby and the force summed systems have advantages and disadvantages that
must be considered in conjunction with the specific airplane and control system application.
The most significant differences between the two types of mechanization are in the
following areas.
Normal Performance.-The single channel operation of the active/standby system can give
optimum performance. In the force summed system, residual actuator force fight can affect
output resolution and reduce actuator stiffness.
Failure Transients.-The force summed system can be mechanized to give very small failure
transients. The active/standby system design muit trade failure detection levels and nuisance
trips against allowable failure transients.
Performance After Failure. -The active/standby system preserves normal performance in the
failure sequence from the active channel to the standby channel and on to the second
standby channel. The force summed system suffers a performance degradation as channel
failures occur. This degradation can be exhibited as reduced resolution capability and force
output.
Failure Monitoring.-The active/standby system requires immediate failure detection to be
safe following failures. Consequently, each standby channel in the active/standby system
must be continually monitored to assure that it is capable of control if the active channel
fails. Furthermore, somewhere in the system a device like a switch or blocking valve is
required to provide a successful transfer to a standby channel, upon detection of a
malfunctioning active channel. The force summed system does not require immediate
detection of a failure to be safe. The force summed system utilizes only active channels
continually monitoring each other and requires no immediate switching to be safe. Failure
detection is only required to enable a failed channel to be shut down before another failure
occurs.
2.4.1 CONCEPT DESCRIPTIONS
2.4.1.1 Active/Standby Description
The active/standby configuration incorporates multiple channels, only one of which
controls the output of the system at any one time. To provide dual fail-operative
performance; i.e., continue operation after sustaining two failures, the active/standby
system redundancy level is triple channel. This is accomplished by making each control
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channel essentially dual; an actuator channel and a model channel. The monitoring system
compares the actuator channel with the model channel, and, if a disagreement exists, that
control channel is deactivated. Using this form of in-line monitoring keeps the redundant
control channel separate with a minimum of inter-channel connection.
The control channels operate independently and failures of the active control channel cause
transfer to a correctly operating standby control channel with no performance degradation.
Because the standby control channels are not load sharing, they cannot oppose a failure in
the active control channel. Therefore, rapid failure detection and transfer between control
channels is essential to accomplish fail-operational performance.
Referring to figures 5 and 7, each actuation channel, denoted by A, B, and C, is connected
to the common output. One channel, at a time, is activated to become the active channel by
deactivating its bypass valve. Deactivating a bypass valve allows that actuator to produce an
output force and thereby allowing it to control the output. Simultaneously, the bypass
valves on the standby channels are activated to bypass their respective actuators, thus
preventing the standby channels from controlling the output.
Once a channel is activated, then an input command, denoted by subscript c, to the servo
summing amplifier produces an error signal to the servo valve. The servo valve responds to
produce a hydraulic flow to cause the actuator piston to move. This movement is sensed
electrically by an LVDT (linear variable differential transformer) to provide position
feedback through the feedback electronics to the servo amplifier to close the position loop.
Failure detection of an active channel is accomplished with a model channel that monitors
the actuation channel. A servo amplifier, servo valve, position LVDT, feedback electronics,
and a differential pressure transducer make up the monitor channel system. The amount of
mistrack between the actuator channel and the model channel is measured as a servo valve
Ap signal. If this signal becomes excessive, the failure detection logic is activated to bypass
that active channel and to switch a standby channel to become a new active channel.
2.4.1.2 Force Summed Description
The parallel-active, force summed configuration incorporates multiple channels which
perform identical control functions simultaneously. The parallel-active system requires all of
the control channels to be working at the same time and working together at some point in
the control system.
Fail-operational capability can be achieved by majority voting three or more active
actuators. Dual fail-operative performance is provided with four channels, if the first failed
channel has been deactivated before the second channel fails. A failed channel in the force
summed system is automatically overpowered by the remaining channels and the magnitude
of the failure transient is minimized. The failure of one channel is compensated for by the
remaining correctly operating channels (to varying degrees). Hence, the failure of one of the
control channels can cause an output performance change. However, it is not necessary to
immediately deactivate the failed channel.
Referring to figures 6 and 8, each of the four actuation channels (A, B, C, and D) is
connected to the common output. Eacih actuator channel is activated by operating its
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bypass valve to not bypass, thereby allowing that actuator to produce an output force. In
normal operation, all four channels are activated to function together. Once an actuator
channel is activated, an input command to the servo amplifier produces a signal to the servo
valve which, in turn, produces a hydraulic flow to cause the actuator piston to move. This
movement is sensed by an LVDT to provide an electrical feedback signal through the
feedback electronics to the servo amplifier to close the position loop. Should all four
channels not go to exactly the same output position, each of the actuator channels will
oppose the others. In doing so, the attempt to produce an output position causes a
differential pressure to build up within the actuator.
Electrical and mechanical unbalances between the four servo channels are corrected by
feeding back to the position loop, a signal proportional to the valve Ap. This signal is shown
integrated electronically and fed back to provide the necessary steady-state balancing input.
These signals are also fed through a failure logic, such that if the signals exceed a specified
magnitude for a certain period of time, a channel failure is indicated, and that channel is
deactivated. Operation continues on the remaining channels.
2.4.2 STUDY REQUIREMENTS AND APPROACH
The objective of the concept comparison study was to produce a quantitative evaluation of
the two selected actuation configurations. The general approach taken was to conduct an
extensive simulation study using an analog computer, and to conduct various analytical
trade studies.
The analog simulation study was used to develop the detail mechanization definition of
both actuator concepts, to evaluate their operational and performance characteristics, and
to determine the sensitivity of design parameter variations on their operation.
Performance criteria used in the analog simulation study were frequency response, transient
response, resolution, and failure transients.
Performance characteristics for each criterion were determined for normal operation and for
failed channel(s) operation.
Analog simulator tests were also conducted to determine the sensitivity of varying these
actuator design parameters: valve pressure and valve flow gain, valve flow limit, system
backlash, actuator friction and damping, actuator rod spring, and actuator dynamic spring.
The effect of parameter variations were determined by evaluating changes in performance
characteristics.
The analog study was divided into a configuration definition phase and an evaluation phase.
In the first phase, each secondary servo actuator concept was analyzed to determine the
effect on system performance and failure detection capability when using a single-stage or
two-stage servo valve. During this phase, failure detection thresholds and time delays were
established to minimize failure transients during failure conditions and to avoid nuisance
failures during normal operation. During the second phase, performance under normal
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operating conditions and under failure conditions were evaluated. Similarly, each system's
sensitivity to design parameter variations was evaluated.
The analytical trade studies compared the two actuator concepts relative to safety
reliability, malfunction reliability, survivability/vulnerability, and system implementation.
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Performance characteristics of both the active/standby and the force summed systems are
summarized in figures 26, 27, and 28.
The frequency response plots on figure 26 show that the force summed system has a better
frequency response characteristic than the active/standby system. This is attributed to the
greater force capability of the force summed system. For normal operation, the force
summed system had four times the force capability of the active/standby system.
After a channel failure was detected and disengaged, the force summed system's frequency
response characteristics were degraded. Furthermore, the steady-state output was reduced
due to the added detent load as channels were disengaged.
The active/standby system showed no loss in frequency response after switching from an
active to a standby channel, since a standby channel has the same performance capability
when activated.
Figure 27 depicts the transient response characteristics of the active/standby system and the
force summed system (normal operation, one disengaged channel, and two disengaged
channels). Under normal conditions both systems displayed very similar transient response
characteristics. However, upon channel failure detection and disengagement, the force
summed system showed a degraded transient response characteristic caused by the centering
detent spring that is engaged to the system output upon channel disengagement. The
centering detent spring always forces the position output towards null. Thus, whenever the
command is away from null, the centering detent acts to retard that motion. For commands
toward null, the centering detent acts to enhance that motion. No similar centering detent
spring is engaged in the active/standby system. Therefore, no similar performance
degradation was observed with the active/standby.
Resolution data for the two systems are presented in figure 28. For normal operating
conditions, the force summed system had better resolution characteristics (less hysteresis
loss) than the active/standby system. This is attributed to the greater force capability of the
force summed system. However, channel disengagements degraded the force summed
resolution characteristics, but did not affect the active/standby system.
The force summed system resolution data also showed an output versus input gain reduction
about null for one and two channel failures. The reason for this gain reduction about null is
the system centering detents that are added as channels are disengaged. These absorb some
of the system force capability. However, when the actuation system overcomes the
maximum detent force level, the output to input gain returns to normal.
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Figures 29 and 30 summarize the comparison of the active/standby and force summed
failure transients due to slowover, high gain, passive, step, and oscillatory failures.
No oscillatory failure monitoring system was modeled for either system. However, under
certain conditions, an oscillatory failure was detected as a slowover failure.
Generally, the active/standby system experienced larger failure transients than the forced
summed system. The failure transient due to a faulty force summed channel was attenuated
by the remaining good channels and was limited in magnitude by the failure detection
threshold. The active/standby failure transient was not attenuated, although it was limited
in magnitude by its failure detection threshold.
The data analyzed to evaluate the relative (active/standby and force summed) system
sensitivities to variations in actuator design parameters are summarized in figure 31. This
figure shows that the parameter valve pressure gain, valve flow limit, and actuator dynamic
spring have no, or relatively insignificant, effect on actuation system performance. Figure 31
also shows that valve flow gain, system backlash, actuator friction, damping, and actuator
rod spring are the design parameters having the greatest effect on actuation system
performance.
As a result of the studies conducted, the two actuator concepts were evaluated and ranked
relative to each other. The ranking of the two concepts based on the selected criteria is
presented in table 3. These criteria are not weighted and only a qualitative comparison is
stated (i.e., better or worse). The quantitative data substantiating table 3 are contained in
paragraph 3.4.
The comparison indicates that the force summed concept better meets performance
requirements than does the active/standby. However, the active/standby is superior in
meeting reliability, maintainability, survivability, weight, and cost requirements.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Boeing Company has completed a study of flight control system redundancy
mechanization applicable to aircraft requiring fail-operational control systems.
Two methods of actuator redundancy mechanization representative of those most likely to
be used in future airplanes have been studied to provide a quantitative assessment of design
application to an AST airplane. The two actuator configurations are a four-channel, force
summed system, and a three-channel, active/standby system.
As a result of the studies conducted, the two actuator concepts were evaluated and ranked
relative to each other. The comparison indicates that the force summed concept better
meets performance requirements than does the active/standby. However, the active/standby
is superior in meeting reqbirements of reliability, maintainability, survivability, weight, and
cost. Based on these observations, the force summed, secondary actuator system would be
the most likely candidate at this time, for an AST application.
In other aircraft applications, where stability augmentation control requirements are less
severe and actuator system performance requirements are less stringent, the active/standby
system would be a strong candidate.
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The actuator configurations were developed in as generalized a form as practical to obtain
the basic knowledge and experience of the operational performance characteristics of the
two concepts.
Actuator math models of the two configurations were developed and simulated on an analog
computer. This simulation study provided the following:
1. A detail definition of the configurations and component mechanization
2. An evaluation of failure detection implementation methods
3. An evaluation of normal operational performance
4. An evaluation of performance over a wide range of failures
5. A determination of actuator configuration sensitive parameters
6. A determination of critical actuator system parameters pertinent to the piloted motion
simulation study task
Safety reliability, maintainability, vulnerability, weight, and cost were assessed to aid in
establishing a mechanization preference, in addition to defining the detailed mechanizations
of the two concepts and determining and comparing their operational and performance
characteristics.
Acceptable control system performance is determined by the airplane stability and control
characteristics consistent with the mission requirements. The failure-corrective character-
istics of an actuation system are the performance characteristics that the control system
exhibits when going from one operating mode to another as a result of a component or
channel failure; these are as important as the performance characteristics in each failure
mode. The general criteria developed in this study relative to acceptable performance
degradation and failure transient characteristics for the secondary actuation system were
based on pilot ratings of airplane handling qualities. The interaction of the pilot and airplane
response with redundant control system designs is important because of performance
changes and control transients that occur with failures or actuation shutdown. A piloted
motion simulation using the FSAA at Ames was used to investigate and evaluate these
effects. No criteria were established relative to augmentation or autopilot control
requirements. The piloted simulation study provided the following:
1. A control transient evaluation to relate actuator transient variations with pilot rating
2. A design parameter evaluation to relate actuator performance variations with pilot
rating
3. A determination of the allowable limits of critical actuation system design parameters
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Future advanced airplane configurations are expected to include major design changes in
order to achieve important desired benefits. Some of these recognized benefits are improved
airplane performance and utilization, improved costs, maintainability, and survivability,
design flexibility, precision control and optimum reponse.
Advanced flight control technology will play an important part in the successful
accomplishment of producing these benefits. The significant payoff of advanced control
approaches is in the selection of the initial aircraft configuration through an aircraft design
approach which permits full tradeoffs between aerodynamics, structures, and controls.
In the commercial market, aircraft utilization is becoming more and more significant.
Airline economics are affected by schedule reliability which, in turn, is related to such
factors as air space and terminal-area congestion, and weather. The impact of all-weather
operation is exemplified by the installation of automatic landing systems as basic equipment
on the lastest generation of commercial aircraft. Automatic landing system requirements
have had a significant impact on the resulting flight control system configuration. The
changing air traffic control environment will undoubtedly have a similar impact on the
system design resulting in a requirement for more automation in the flight controls area.
Clearly, safety must not be compromised. When relying on the control system for basic
flight safety at all times, a complete failure is intolerable. Sufficient redundancy must
therefore be built into all sections of the control system and power supplies to ensure
survival in the event of local failures and to reduce the risk of total failure to a very
low level.
Design freedom should be maintained to allow practical use of current technology in
whatever combinations best satisfy the specific requirements, provided that sufficient
confidence has been established in the technology to warrant its use. However, the point at
which new technology has been sufficiently demonstrated for reasonable technical and cost
risk is often a difficult question to answer.
There is considerable planning underway to work on active control design procedures and
applications to provide a comprehensive base for applying active controls to future civil
aircraft designs.
The successful demonstration of any of the advanced control concepts is heavily dependent
on the associated control system and its mechanization. Since computation and actuation
systems are key elements of any control system, the promise of advanced controls will not
be realized until the technology for providing the required reliability with acceptable system
cost is in hand. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the control system
design capability is available to allow the utilization of advanced control concepts in the
next generation of commercial transports.
The conclusions reached in this study indicate a continued need for research and
development of flight critical, secondary actuator systems. Specifically:
1. Develop the true active/standby concept to a hybridized active/on-line concept.
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2. Develop detail hardware design definitions of the force summed, active/standby, and
hybridized active/on-line actuator concepts.
3. Develop detail definitions of failure monitoring systems for these same actuator
concepts.
4. Develop the electronic and mechanical interfaces and evaluate their mutual effects for
these same actuator concepts.
5. After developing these first four items, quantitatively determine the advantages and
disadvantages of the three actuator concepts.
6. Based on the results of item five, fabricate and test the appropriate actuator concepts
in a mini-rig suitable for interfacing with a piloted simulator, like the FSAA at
NASA-ARC.
7. Conduct a piloted simulation evaluation with the actual actuator hardware interfaced
with a simulated advanced flight-critical, airplane control application.
8. Fabricate and test flight worthy, redundant secondary actuator hardware.
9. Demonstrate and evaluate flight worthiness of flight-critical, redundant secondary
actuator mechanizations in a flight test program.
24
Actuator Actuator Actuator Actuator
no. 1 no. 2 no. 3 no. 4
L _ I I "Force summed"
output
Motor Differential Motor
no. 1 gearbox no. 2
Rotary/linear
actuator
Differenti al[@
"Velocity summed"
output
Motor Differential Motor
no. 3 gearbox no.4
Actuator
no. 1
Actuator i
no. 2
Actuator "Position summed"
no. 3 output
Actuator
Q no. 4
Figure 1.-Parallel/Active Mechanizations
Active Standby Standby
control Monitor control Monitor control Monitor
no. 1 no. 1 no. 2 no. 2 no. 3 no. 3
Comparator
Engage
control
!, Output
Figure 2.-Active/Standby Mechanization
controls
Pilot's
control
column Sensors &
Secondary
actuators
Mechanical
command Surface Airplane
XDCR power dynam ics
actuators
Figure 3.-Control System Schematic
Sensor Computation Secondary
U
C
(Typical flight critical electric command)
Advantages:
* Interfaces 4 electronics to 3 power actuators
* Intermediate signal power amplification
* Redundancy management problems treated at lower force levels
* Single valued command to surface actuators
* Surface power actuators isolated from upstream command anomalies
* Permits simpler and more reliable surface power actuator mechanization
Figure 4.-Secondary Actuators
Two-stage
electrohydraulic
servovalve (actuator) Shutoff valve
-Pressure port
Return port
LVDT o
Output shaft C 1  R C2
LVDT I Monitor
differential
Note: One of three eectrohdraulic pressure sensor
identical channels Actuator servovalve (monitor)
attached to the differential pressure
output shaft sensor and relief/bypass valve
Figure 5.-Active/Standby Actuator, Single Actuator Element
Single-stage
electrohydraulic
servovalve Shutoff valve
r 77 _7/- Pressure port
Flex rod - Return port
LVDT
Output shaft
C 1  R C2
LVDT
Note: One of four identical
channels attached to
the output shaft Actuator
differential pressure
sensor and relief bypass valve
Figure 6.-Force-Summed Actuator, Single Actuator Element
Channel A
Feedback
electronics LVDT
Command Servo Servo
Ac  amp valve Actuator
Failure Actuator
threshold Diff. press. bypasso
and time X-ducers valve
delay
Command Servo Servo 0
A m  amp valve E
Feedback I  I  Output
electronics LVDT
_ To
failure
indicator
Failure
S detection-
logic
Command r--------------7
Bc mChannel B
Command
Command---------
C
c
Charinel C
Command
Figure 7.-Triple Channel, Active/Standby, Secondary Actuator
Functional Diagram
31 OF "00U ~~QUA YI
Channel A
To Actuator
failure Bypass
indicator valve
- - - - -- - valve -
Failure threshold
and time delay
Diff. press.
X-ducer
Integrator
Command Servo Servo
SCommand vChanne tutor
I
C---------------------------------------
FuElctronal Diagramcs
32
Command C
Output
Command I Channel C
C -L___.. . .L .
I---- - ------
Command I Channel DD l I
Figure 8.-Ouad Channel, Force Summed, Secondary Actuator
Functional Diagram
6 Column
LVDT Mechanical path negator feedback
Centering spring
6 HSAS m S
.... .5HSAS + + 5mfilter + 6 SAS Master
servo
w 6m
w Trim Col.
control 
- inter- Trim
HSAS 6 logic lock motor
QHSAS feedback CSS EC Servo LVDT
compensation failure off-load
LVDT EC. ecs
+ecs servo
ECSS Po er 5h e 5
act. I Horizontal
Q ECSS Air stabilizer
data
Figure 9.-B2707-300 Longitudinal Control Actuation System Schematic
Column Trim
inter Control
lock logic
Trim on
Motor 0$
6tm 0
SColumn Master 5ms + - 6m + 65 Surfm+ce 61h0 servo 
actuator
Mech-path
negator feedback
2.5 HSAS 6 HSAS + 6 SAS + EC Secs
+filter +servo
HSAS
Q S feedback E CSSr e  Secondary actuator
compensation
ECSS
QECSS Air
data
Figure 10.-Block Diagram, B2707-300 Longitudinal Control System
I
Closed - Actuator
Open - -6 lim
Switching characteristics 6 lim
Filter 1 Filter 2
as4+a2s3+a3s2+a4s+a5 I  max c1s4+c2s3 +c3 c sc
4 b +4 b 2 s3+ b  2+ b4 s+ b 5 
7- 6m ax s d s4+d 
2s3
6 +
f,(t)=2;(t-tf-a T)AnU (t-tf-A Tn) A
n-1 +
f2(t)=B sin o(t-tf)ea(t-tf)u (t-tf)
Hysteresis Deadband Threshold
V- 
__, I - I 
_ becs
Figure 11.-Secondary Actuator (E. C. Servo) Functional Diagram
10
Airplane with nominally
9 - min. safe H/Q
8 Airplane with
normal H/Q
PR limit 7.0
for single
7 ,o for single / PR limit 6.5/ control sys.
failure with for second
S 6 nom. min. safe control sys.
H/Q airplane / failure with
S/ normal H/Q
. / airplane
4/
PR limit 3.5
for single
3 - / control sys.
/ failure with
/ / normal H/O /
/ airplane
Failure transient (magnitude)
or
design parameter variation
Figure 12.-Evaluation Criteria FSAA Simulation Tests
36
10
9
8
7- A
6
5
4
3 0 0 Pilot A, min. safe H/OQ
2 A Pilot B, normal H/OQ
0 1 2 3 4 5
Step amplitude, degrees
Figure 13.-High-Speed Cruise Step Input Sensitivity
37
0 Pilot A, min. safe H/Q
o Pilot A, normal. H/Q
A Pilot B, normal H/Q
bir
9 0
0 -
0 2 4 6 8 10
Step amplitude, degrees
Figure 14.-Landing Approach Step Input Sensitivity
38
5-
4-
38
10
* Pilot D, min. safe H/Q
A Pilot B, normal H/Q
8
7
Smin6 imum sae
normal0
4
3-
2 No minimum safe limit
No second-failure normal
operation limit
I " I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5
Oscillatory amplitude, degrees
(w= 1Hz)
Figure 15.-High Speed Cruise, Oscillatory Amplitude Sensitivity
39
* Pilot A, min. safe H/Q
A ot , mD .- U/
Pilot B, normal H/Q
Pilot C, min. safe H/Q
10
8 -
7 -
A
3
26 -
o No second-failure normal
operation limit
1
0 2 4 6 8 10
Oscillatory amplitude, degrees
o= 1 Hz
Figure 16.-Landing Approach, Oscillatory Amplitude Sensitivity
40
10
A - Pilot B, normal H/Q
9 - Pilot D, min. safe H/Q
8
7
Normal
4-
Minimum safe
Single-failure limit No second-failure normal
operation limit
1 >
II I
0 1 2 3 4 5
Oscillatory frequency, Hz
(Ampl = 2 deg)
Figure 17.-High Speed Cruise, Oscillatory Frequency Sensitivity
41
10 A Pilot B, min. safe H/Q
A Pilot B, normal H/O
9
8
7
6
5
0
4 I \
Note: Amplitude of oscillation
was 8 deg. when airplane
2 was given normal handling
qualities. The amplitude
was 4 deg. when airplane
1 was given min. safe
handling qualities.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Oscillatory Frequency, Hz (see note)
Figure 18.-Landing Approach, Oscillatory Frequency Sensitivity
42
10
9 - A Pilot B, min. safe H/Q
8 A Pilot B, normal H/Q
7 Minimum safe
6
5
4 n
3-
No minimum safe limit
2
1
0 1 2 3 4 5
Switching delay, sec
Figure 19.-Landing Approach, Switching Delay Sensitivity
43
o Pilot A, normal H/Q
A Pilot B, min. safe H/Q
10 -
Normal
9
8
Minimum safe
6
4P 5
- No minimum safe limit
3 E
2
I I I I I I
0 1 2 3 4 5
Deadband, degrees
Figure 20.-High Speed Cruise, Deadband Sensitivity
44
10 10 Pilot B, normal H/Q
M Pilot C, min. safe H/Q
9 - Pilot D, normal H/Q
8•
7
6
5
4
3
No minimum safe limit
2
0 2 4 6 8 10
Deadband, degrees
Figure 21.-Landing Approach, Deadband Sensitivity
45
10 .
9 -
8 A A Pilot B, min. safe H/Q
0 Pilot E, normal H/Q
7
• tNorrna\
6-
0
5
4
3 No normal operation limit
2
0 1 2 3 4 5
Hysteresis, degrees
Figure 22.-High-Speed Cruise, Hysteresis Sensitivity
46
* Pilot C, min. safe H/Q
Pilot D, normal H/Q
10
9
8 - a/
7 A
S5
Normal /,Minimum safe / Normal
Ist fail 1 st fail 2nd fail
0 2 4 6 8 10
Hysteresis, degrees
Figure 23.-Landing Approach, Hysteresis Sensitivity
47
10 - Pilot B, min. safe H/Q
A Pilot B, normal H/Q
9
8-
7A 7 Norma\
2 _ No second-failure normal
operation limit
1-
0 1 2 3 4 5
Threshold, degrees
Figure 24.-High-Speed Cruise, Threshold Sensitivity
48
10
A Pilot B, normal H/Q
9 - Pilot C, min. safe H/Q
8
7
6 Minimumsafel Nrmal
6 6
0 2 4 6 8 10
Threshold, degrees
Figure 25.-Landing Approach, Threshold Sensitivity
49
4 Operative channels'(normal)
See note 
---- 3 Operative channels.
2 Operative channels
-12 I - -- --- ---- - - -1 1 ..
-12
-24
E
-36
- Force summed
----- Active/standby
Note: Steady state output degradation is shown
by low frequency amplitude offset in -dB
(amplitude ratio normalized to normal operation)
.01 0.1 1.0 10. 100.
Frequency, Hz
Figure 26.-Frequency Response Performance Degradation Comparison
Active/Standby
-- - --- - -
+100%
00.
0 . . .I ...
0! i i ::c:
-100% 7-
-100%-:i. T - ! _ i. .i
Force Summed
+100% S H ......
0
+100% operative
channels
: 
0
-100%
. . . . II r0-
+0 "0± L |operative
-100%
channels
CL 0 -
-100% _ , L
+0051
0
-100% Two
+100% - operative
SJRchannels
00.
-100% L I
Figure 27.-Transient Response Performance Degradation, Comparison
51
Force summed
(operative channels) Active/standby
100% - (4) (3)
(2)
50% -
3% 4% 6% 4%
0%
-50%
-100%
Figure 28.-Resolution Degradation Comparison
High gain
6
x x 5/ x5 /
- 3 -o
LL 2 / _ 3L4 Active/standby
1 I Force summed
0 2nd 1st 1 2nd 1st
0
Failure Failure
Passive Step
10- 10 /
8* 8 /
6' -66 6
4 4 ctive/standby
.- . 2 . Force summed
LL 0 2nd 1st 2nd 1st
0
Failure Failure
Failure transient, % of Xmax
Failure type Active/standby Force summed
1st failure 2nd failure 1st failure 2nd failure
Slowover 5 5 1.8 1.8
High gain 3 3 2.3 2.3
Passive 3 3 1.0 1.2
Step 10 10 .6 .7
Figure 29.-Failure Transient Slow Over, High Gain, Passive, and Step Comparisons
53
10410 1010
Failure
transient,
% of X max 5 5 5 Acti ve/standby
Force summed
0 / 2nd  st 0 2nd / 1st / 2nd / st
Failure Failure 0 Failure
Failure transient, % of Xmax
Failure command Force summed
-Amp l F T Active/ -- -
Ampl Freq, standby 4 operative - 3 operative
% of Xmax Hz channels channels
10 0.1 7.0 .5 .5
10 1.0 7.0 .5 .5 Failure detected
10 10. 3.0 .3 .3
Failure not detected
Figure 30.-Oscillatory Failure Transient Comparison
Kp (psi/mA) Kv (in3.mA/s) QL (in3/s) F, bf) D, (Ibf-s/in)Ks, (Ibf/inF, (I f) , (Ibfs/in)
X 103 X10-4 ) X 03)
103 104 105 .02 .06 .4 .7 1.0 0 4 8 12 0 10 20 6 8 10 1.5 2.0 2.5 8.5 11.0 13.5
I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I 1 Il l
20
-3dB cutoff,
Hz 10 - - - -
-10 
450 cutoff, I -- -
Hz 5- -
0 I I I I I I I I I I I
1.5 -
Transition 1.0 -
time, a
sec .5
o I I I i I I _ 1 I I I I I I I I I I I
15
Hysteresis 10 -
- Fo e summed
loss,
% of Xmax 5 X X Active/standby
0 oI I I l
15
Failure 10
transient,
% of Xmax
5-- 0 --- X -X X --
o -l II I l I=  i i I I I i1 I . I I - *1
106  107 108 109 0 5 10 5 10 15 20 0 10 20 30 0 30 60 90 1000 1400 1700 2.5 4.5 1.5 2.5
Kp, Pa/mA Kv , m3 .mA/s X 107 QL' m3 /s X 106 B, m X 105 F, N D, N.s/m Ks,N/m X 10 -6  K,N/m X 10 -6
Pressure Flow Flow Backlash Friction Damping Rod Dynamic
gain gain limit spring spring
Figure '1.-Design Parameter Sensitivity Comparison
I'plyT)OUT la w 55
Table 1.-Summary of Failure Transient Test Results
Landing Approach
Baseline airplane handling qualities level
FailurecFailure Normal Min. safe
category
1st failure 2nd failure 1st failure
Step, degrees 1.85 < 5.7 < 1.85
Oscillatory (w= 1 Hz) ampl, deg <1.30 - <4.0
Oscillatory o, Hz (1) >1.0 - >1.0
Switching delay, sec < 1.0 < 3.65 -
High Speed Cruise (M = 2.7)
Baseline airplane handling qualities level
Failure Normal Min. safe
category
1st failure 2nd failure 1st failure
Step, deg <.75 < 2.0 < 1.15
Oscillatory (w=1 Hz) ampl, deg <.25 - -
Oscillatory (ampl = 2 deg)
o, Hz > .5 1 .5
Switching delay, sec
Note: Failure transient levels represent stabilizer deflection angle.
(1): Min. safe ampl = 4 degrees
normal ampl = 8 degrees
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Table 2.-Summary of Actuator Design Parameter Evaluation Test Results
Landing Approach
Baseline airplane handling qualities level
Parameter
category Normal Min. safe
1st failure 2nd failure 1st failure
Dead band, deg < .2 < 5.8 -
Hysteresis, deg < .5 < 6.5 < 3.7
Threshold, deg <1.7 <9.7 -
High-Speed Cruise (M = 2.7)
Baseline airplane handling qualities levelParameter
category Normal Min. safe
1st failure 2nd failure 1st failure
Dead band, deg < 1.15
Hysteresis, deg 
- - < 1.15
Threshold, deg < .5
Note: Parameter magnitudes are given in terms of stabilizer deflection angle.
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Table 3.-Actuator Concepts Comparison Summary
Criteria Active/standby Force summed
Number of actuator channels Better Worse
Normal performance Worse Better
Failure performance Better Worse
Failure transients Worse Better
Safety reliability Better Worse
Maintainability Better Worse
Vulnerability Better Worse
Volume Better Worse
Weight Better Worse
Cost Better Worse
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3.0 DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS OF STUDY TASKS
This section, summarized in section 2.0, presents the detailed results of the studies
conducted under this contract. Specifically, the study ground rules and approach, the
piloted simulation evaluation results, and the concept comparison study results are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
3.1 STUDY GROUND RULES
The overall objective of this study was to broaden the technology base for evolving the most
suitable and advantagous actuation system concepts for future advanced airplane flight
control systems. Two alternative and specific candidate actuation concepts were investigated
and evaluated to obtain the basic knowledge and experience of the operational and
performance characteristics of the concepts as a basis for determining their applicability and
practicality for AST control systems. The study provided a genuine determination of
actuator system operating characteristics, handling qualities effects, and various failure
modes with flight crew interaction and simulated airplane response. A detailed design
definition was produced and comparisons were made of the two systems to evaluate their
advantages and disadvantages. A study with the B2707-300 SST simulated on the FSAA at
NASA-ARC established allowable limits of critical actuation-system design parameters for
use in developing the detailed design definition of the two concepts. This simulation study
was conducted in conjunction with the "Development of Handling Qualities Criteria for
Large Advanced Supersonic Aircraft" study contract. To determine the applicability and
practicality of the candidate actuation concepts for an AST, these concepts were developed
and configured in conjunction with a suitable, specific AST requirement. The B2707-300
pitch axis control system as currently mechanized in the NASA-ARC simulation was the
basis for formulating the actuation system initial design requirements.
3.2 STUDY APPROACH
The technical approach involved conducting studies in three areas.
A piloted motion simulation using the FSAA at Ames was used to investigate and evaluate
the interaction of the pilot and airplane response with performance changes and control
transients that occur within the actuation system. This piloted simulation study provided
the following data:
1. A control transient evaluation to relate actuator transient variations with pilot rating
2. A design parameter evaluation to relate actuator performance variations with pilot
rating
3. A determination of the allowable limits of critical actuation system design parameters
A quantitative evaluation was made of both actuator mechanization concepts to determine
their operational and performance characteristics for normal conditions, for failure
conditions, and for variations in critical design parameters.
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Actuator math models of the two configurations were developed and simulated on an analog
computer. The actuator configurations were developed in as generalized a form as practical
to obtain the basic knowledge and experience of the operational performance characteristics
of the two concepts. This simulation study provided the following:
I. A detail definition of the configurations and components mechanization
2. An evaluation of failure detection implementation methods
3. An evaluation of normal operational performance
4. An evaluation of performance over a wide range of failures
5. A determination of actuator configuration sensitive parameters
6. A determination of critical actuator system parameters pertinent to the piloted motion
simulation study task
In addition to defining the detail mechanizations of the two concepts and determining and
comparing their operational and performance characteristics, safety reliability, maintain-
ability, vulnerability, weight, and cost, trade studies were also conducted to aid in
establishing a mechanization preference.
3.3 PILOTED SIMULATION STUDY
A piloted motion simulation evaluation was conducted on the FSAA at NASA-Ames. This
evaluation corresponded to task 3 of the study contract. This section describes the purpose
and background related to the simulation test, presents a summary and conclusions of the
evaluation, and discusses the simulation test and test results.
3.3.1 SCOPE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of the piloted motion simulation test was to define the allowable limits of
critical actuation system design parameters for the B2707-300 pitch axis EC servo. This
simulator test was conducted with the FSAA at Ames immediately following the second
handling qualities simulation session under the base contract, NAS2-7966.
The original plans for this study required analog models of the two study concepts to be
interfaced with the digital simulation of the B2707-300 on the FSAA. However, limitations
on the analog model frequency content imposed by the sampling rate of the digital
simulation and insufficient analog computer hardware, resulted in a reevaluation of the
secondary actuator representation to be used in conducting the piloted tests. Thus, a
different approach to achieve the same results was needed. The approach selected was to
represent the actuator system on the FSAA only; i.e., only digital and no analog
representation. The study objectives and purpose remained the same, and would be satisfied.
The following considerations were significant in modifying the original plan:
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* Analog computer capability permitted only two-channel implementation.
* Analog/FSAA interface limited actuator system natural frequency to less than 2.5 Hz
to avoid instabilities.
* Element of risk involved to interface analog simulation to FSAA digital simulation.
* Study objectives could be satisfied (i.e., actuator critical design parameters could be
evaluated) with use of FSAA simulation only.
* FSAA digital simulation could be increased from 1st to 4th order to improve
representation.
* FSAA table look-up routines could be used to simulate transients.
* FSAA could not be programmed to shift from one channel characteristic to another
without having to IC the computer.
* No analog simulation required if use FSAA only.
* Flexibility to directly relate the actuator system to airplane performance would be
compromised, yet end results would be the same.
* Boeing-based simulation work tasks would be increased to describe and evaluate critical
actuator system parameters yet analog implementation task on the FSAA would be
eliminated.
The decision not to interface an analog representation of the actuator system with the
FSAA is not meant to suggest that interfacing the FSAA with an analog representation
(either computer or hardware models) at some other time would not be desirable. At a
future time it could be very desirable to evaluate the discrete transient effects and
nonlinearities of the actual secondary actuator systems with a piloted motion simulator.
3.3.2 SIMULATION TESTS
The actuation system simulation tests were conducted in conjunction with, and immediately
following the second simulation session of the "Handling Qualities Criteria" development
testing on the FSAA. The simulator test time was scheduled for two weeks to conduct the
actuator system study. The actuator study test was consistent with, and dependent on, the
handling qualities work (particularly the FSAA studies) of the basic contract. The airplane
configurations and flight conditions were selected on the basis of the handling
qualities work.
3.3.2.1 Simulation Configuration
Four airplane test configurations were selected as representative of the B2707-300 aircraft
flight control envelope. The four configurations represent a high-speed cruise flight
condition and a landing approach flight condition, both within a normal operation
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boundary and a minimum-safe operation boundary. The longitudinal control characteristics
of both flight conditions are depicted on figures 32 and 33.
The longitudinal control system was used for evaluating the control characteristics of the
actuation system. Functional diagrams of the control system are shown in figures 9, 10, and
34, A functional diagram of the secondary actuator sed in the study is shown in figur..e 11.
3.3.2.2 Test Results
The testing performed on the FSAA simulator was divided into two categories. The first
category evaluated the effects of different control system failure modes on airplane handling
qualities. The second category investigated the effects of variations of actuator design
parameters on airplane handling qualities. Each test category was evaluated at the four flight
conditions described in paragraphs 2.3.1 and 3.3.2.1 which included operation at landing
approach and high speed cruise. The airplane configurations were chosen such that the
handling qualities bordered on the lower limits of normal and minimum safe operation. At
each combination of airplane configuration and flight condition a test sequence was
performed with changing actuator characteristics, until clear trends in pilot ratings were
established. The test procedure is summarized in table 4.
Figure 35 shows the pilot tasks performed during a typical landing approach test. A similar
task outline for the cruise condition is shown in figure 36. Each test was evaluated by the
simulator pilot using the Cooper-Harper rating scale. The Cooper-Harper rating scale is
shown in figure 37.
The test results of the FSAA evaluation are contained in tables 1 and 2 and figure 13
through 25, and are discussed in paragraph 2.3.4.
3.4 ACTUATION CONCEPT TRADE STUDY
A quantitative evaluation study was made of both actuator mechanization concepts. An
analog computer study and an analytical trade study were conducted. The results of these
studies follow.
3.4.1 ANALOG SIMULATION EVALUATION
The analog computer simulation study evaluated the operation and performance character-
istics of both concepts, and determined the sensitivity of design parameter variations on
their operation. The purpose of this study phase was to develop a detailed design definition
for each system.
3.4.1.1 Configuration Selection
A computer study was performed using analog models of an active/standby and a force
summed secondary servo configuration. These analog models included such nonlinearities as
valve flow and pressure limits, friction, and backlash.
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Each of the analog models included a representative failure detection network and elements
required to eliminate or reduce the effects of nonoscillatory failures.
An oscillatory-failure detection circuit was not included in the analog models. This approach
was forced, in that especially the force summed model was taxing the analog computer to its
limits in terms of available computing elements. There were an insufficient number of
amplifiers to include an oscillatory-failure detection network.
To minimize distortion of the data the characteristics of each model were kept as near alike
as possible. For example, the same actuator model (area, friction, flow limit, stroke) was
used in both models. The load applied to each system was identical in mass, stiffness, and
damping characteristics. An alternative approach was to increase the actuator size in the
active/standby system so that the dynamic piston loading would be the same for the two
systems. This approach would have required estimation of a new set of actuator parameters,
and would have introduced larger uncertainties to the results than the approach taken.
The main disadvantage of the approach taken was that the active/standby system
experienced a larger dynamic piston loading which primarily affected the results of the
frequency response test data.
3.4.1.1.1 Active/Standby Configuration Selection.-A block diagram of the analog model
used to represent the active/standby secondary actuator is shown in figure 38. The elements
of one channel are shown in detail, as is the interface with the adjacent channels. Each of
the adjacent channels is identical to the channel shown. The major elements in each channel
are the servo amplifier (actuator), electrohydraulic servovalve (actuator), piston dynamics,
servo amplifier (monitor), and electrohydraulic servovalve (monitor).
The servo amplifiers and electrohydraulic servovalves of each channel and its monitor are
identical except as detailed later in this section.
Each of the three channels of the active/standby system are interfaced through the block
labeled Load Dynamics. The linkage connecting the secondary actuator to the surface
actuators is represented as a finite mass with viscous damping and with a low-force gradient
centering spring.
The failure-detection logic shown in figure 38 is mechanized so that channel 1 is normally
the active channel. If channel 1 fails, control is transferred to channel 2 provided that
channel 2 is operational. If that is not the case, control is transferred to channel 3.
In the configuration selection process, a single-stage and a two-stage electrohydraulic
servovalve variant of the active/standby system was tested.
Figure 39 shows the single-stage variant of the system with its monitor network
(configuration I). The single-stage valve controls hydraulic flow to the actuator. Differential
pressure across the actuator piston is sensed for use in the failure monitoring system. The
valve in the channel monitor operates "blocked port." The channel monitor's blocked port
pressure is sensed and subtracted from the actuator channel pressure to generate an error
signal. The error signal is tested for amplitude and duration. If it exceeds set limits a
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failure-detected signal is transmitted to the logic network to activate a standby channel and
deactivate the failed active channel.
The channel monitor pressure typically reached maximum system pressure for all but very
small commands. The actuator differential pressure, except for the initial pulse, only
reached a fraction of system pressure. Thus, the failure-detection error signal contained very
little intelligence about the functional state of the channel, as it always was close to system
pressure whenever the piston was in transition.
The two-stage valve variant (configuration II) with its monitor network is shown in
figure 40. The two-stage, electrohydraulic servovalve command input to the first stage
resulted in a proportional displacement of the second-stage spool.
Mechanical feedback from the second stage to the first stage torque motor provided this
proportional control. The displacement of the second stage in turn determined the flow out
of the unit.
The first-stage control pressures provided the driving force to position the second-stage
spool valve. The algebraic sum of the pressure differential in the actuator channel valve and
in the channel monitor valve should be zero if no failure exists. Representative pressure
traces in response to a step command is shown in figure 33. Furthermore, since only
second-stage spool position is monitored, it is not necessary to implement a flow-control
capability in the monitor channel. For this reason, the second stage of the valve in the
channel monitor can be simplified. There is no need to include all passages and metering
devices, as this valve does not control any flow to a downstream actuator. A plain "dummy"
spool, as shown in figure 33, is adequate.
Due to normal variations in system gains, etc., the two signals will never be identical. A
combination of an amplitude threshold and a time delay is used to account for these normal
variations. It should be noted that these tolerances can be much smaller than those in the
previously described single stage system.
A third valve/monitor configuration (configuration III) is shown in figure 41. This one is
similar to the single-stage configuration shown in figure 39. The only difference is that this
third configuration has a two-stage valve rather than a single-stage valve.
A summary of the tests used in selecting the active/standby, valve/monitor configuration is
shown in table 5. These tests all represent failure conditions and are representative of those
which the system would be subjected to.
Figures 42 and 43 summarize the test results for configurations I and II. In evaluating these
two configurations consideration was given to the magnitude of the output transient
(AXo/Xomax) due to a failure and to each system's ability to detect and correct for that
failure.
Output transients due to system failures in configurations I and II are compared in
figure 42. When exposing the active channel to an erroneous ramp command, the output
followed the command until an error signal had been present in the failure detection logic
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long enough for the logic to determine that a failure existed. At this time, control was
transferred to a standby channel. Similarly, if this failure occurred in a monitor channel, the
logic would detect the failure and transfer control to a standby channel. However, in this
case there would be no motion of the output.
A comparison of the performance of the two configurations showed that configuration II
experienced less of a transient than configuration I. Pressure and time tolerances can be set
much tighter in configuration II than in configuration I, thereby resulting in earlier failure
detection.
The high gain failure would typically result from the failure of an amplitude feedback loop.
When comparing performances for this failure, configuration II proved superior due to the
tighter tolerances.
Step failures would result from component failures in the computing elements or drive
electronics. When comparing system performances to these failures, configuration II showed
smaller transients for large steps but gradually approached the same performance as
configuration I as the step amplitudes decreased. During these tests it was found that there
was a cutoff point in step amplitudes below which the system did not detect a failure due to
the respective monitor network error signal thresholds.
System responses to oscillatory failures are compared in figure 43. Oscillatory failures are
typically generated by the computing elements or drive electronics. The failure detection
network required to detect oscillatory failures was not modeled on the analog computer.
The criterion whether or not the system would be able to detect an oscillatory failure was the
error signal magnitude above the detection threshold. Both configurations displayed the
same peak amplitudes. However, configuration II had a somewhat greater ability to detect
failures at higher frequencies.
Comparing the results of the testing of these two configurations, configuration II perfoms
better under failure conditions than does configuration I.
No quantitative testing was conducted on configuration III due to the similarity to
configuration I. Performance under failure conditions would be similar to configuration I,
and inferior to configuration II. This conclusion was verified by spot checks.
As a result of the testing, configuration II was selected as the candidate active/standby
secondary servo to be compared with the force summed servo.
3.4.1.1.2 Force Summed Configuration Selection.-A block diagram of the analog model
used to represent the force summed secondary actuator is shown in Figure 44. One channel
with its equalization circuit is shown in detail. Three additional channels are tied to the
common output to make up the redundant control unit. Each of the redundant channels are
identical to the one channel shown. The major elements of each channel are the servo
amplifier, electrohydraulic servovalve, piston dynamics, equalization circuit, failure detec-
tion logic, and centering detent.
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The four channels are connected in the block labeled load dynamics. This block also
simulates a representative load consisting of a finite mass with viscous damping and low
gradient centering spring. In normal operation, all four pistons move in unison, commanded
by identical command signals. When a failure is detected the failed channel is depressurized
and a centering detent is engaged. This function is accomplished by the channel disengage
relays and associated networks.
The equalization network shown in the diagram (fig. 44) increases the system's tolerance to
differences in the four command signals. It is made up of two parallel paths, one integral
and one proportional. The proportional feedback path in effect reduces the actuator force
gain, thereby reducing the level of force fight within the system. It is intended to handle
short term differences in signal levels due to minor gain variations, etc. The integral path is
intended to reduce the effects of long term differences between the individual command
signals. This is done by integrating up a "trim signal" that will cancel any steady state bias in
a command signal.
Channel failures cause either the pressure feedback signal in the proportional feedback path
or the trim signal in the integral path to exceed a preselected failure threshold level for a
preselected time interval.
A force summed secondary actuator can be designed with a single-stage or a two-stage
electrohydraulic servovalve (fig. 45.) Assuming that the maximum flow requirement is the
same regardless of valve type used, the differences between a single-stage and a two-stage
valve is the pressure gain. To limit the force fight in the system, the proportional pressure
feedback path is used to reduce the force gain to acceptable levels. With this pressure
feedback, valve pressure gain has little meaning since the system pressure gain is forced to a
particular value by the pressure feedback loop. However, if pressure feedback can be
eliminated by using single stage valves, and if this does not severely impair performance, a
reduction in cost and complexity would be possible.
Table 6 summarizes the tests used in the selection of the valve configuration. Six different
valve pressure gain values were selected and a series of performance tests were conducted
with each valve configuration. Two of the valve configurations were also selected for
performance testing under failure conditions, as noted in table 6.
Figure 46 summarizes the results of the frequency response testing. The observed data
shows that valve pressure gain variations had little effect on frequency response. There was
some scatter in data, but no apparent trends. For this reason, envelopes were drawn to
bound the regions within which the data points were located.
A summary of transient response testing and resolution testing is shown in figure 47. Valve
pressure gain affected transient times only when it reached very low values such that the
initial acceleration was significantly reduced.
Actuator resolution capability was not affected by variations in valve pressure gain. This
result was expected as this type of actuator has great acceleration capability and low
friction.
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Figure 48 summarizes the test results of the frequency response testing of the force summed
secondary actuator under failure conditions. Two valve configurations were used in this test
sequence as noted in table 6. The frequency response characteristics were determined for
each of the two configurations with all channels operational, with one channel failed and
with two channels failed.
The transient response data under failure conditions are summarized in figure 49. Variations
in pressure gain had only minor effect on actuator performance. Channel failures, on the
other hand, resulted in considerable performance degradation. This was due in part to the
fact that the force output of the actuator was reduced by the depressurization of a failed
channel, and in part to the engagement of centering detent in each failed channel. The force
capability of this detent amounts to approximately 50% of one channel's force capability.
Also, the depressurized channel acts as a viscous damper and generates a considerable
retarding force as velocity increases.
The resolution testing is summarized in figure 50. Again, variations in pressure gain had little
effect on system performance, however hannel failures resulted in a considerable
performance degradation. Another observation made during the resolution testing was that
with all channels operating no deadband was noticeable. However, as channels were failed a
considerable deadband did develop as shown in figure 50. The magnitude of the deadband
was considerably greater than the magnitude of the hysteresis.
Figure 51 contains a plot of required pressure feedback versus valve pressure gain to satisfy
the criteria for interchannel force fight. This plot indicates that the pressure feedback loop
could be removed if the valve pressure gain is sufficiently low.
The trend in all valve configuration selection tests was that valve pressure gain had little
effect on the performance of a force summed secondary actuator with an external pressure
feedback loop to satisfy a force fight requirement. Only when the valve pressure gain drops
below values typical for a single-stage servovalve does it cause any performance reduction.
Therefore, a single-stage servovalve configuration was selected for the force summed
secondary actuator. This configuration would be used in the performance testing to be
compared with the active/standby concept.
In order to make the force summed model directly comparable to the active/standby it was
also decided to remove the integral feedback path. Thus, the final configuration has neither
the proportional nor integral pressure feedback paths. It uses the piston differential pressure
signal for failure monitoring. This signal is evaluated for amplitude and duration to
determine if a failure condition is present.
3.4.1.2 Normal Operation Performance Evaluation
The active/standby and force summed systems, as described in paragraph 3.4.1.1, with
nominal valued parameters, shown in table 7, and without failures were considered to be the
normal systems. Normal performance characteristics were determined for both actuator
configurations on an analog computer. The normal performance testing provided baseline
frequency response, transient response, and resolution data for overall system evaluation.
Table 8 presents a summary of the test procedures used for the testing.
69
3.4.1.2.1 Active/Standby Test Results.-The active/standby frequency response character-
istics under normal conditions is shown on the Bode plot of figure 52. The system
amplitude response showed slight peaking between 0.4 Hz and 5 Hz. The amplitude
response started to roll off at 5 Hz, and at 8.5 Hz and -3 dB, and at 40 Hz was -35 dB. The
system phase lag data showed a slight phase lag at 0.1 Hz, and 45* phase lag at 3.5 Hz, and a
90" phase lag at 7 Hz.
The system transient test showed a transition time of 0.7 second. The transition time
corresponds to an output rate of 0.033 m/sec (1.3 in./sec) which is equivalent to the control
valve saturated flow rate.
Figure 53 shows an X-Y plot of the normal system steady state output position versus input
command. The largest hysteresis loss, 4% (f.s.), occurred near the null position. The
hysteresis losses are attributed to friction, backlash, and system tolerances.
3.4.1.2.2 Force Summed Test Results.-The force summed frequency response data
characteristic under normal conditions is shown on the Bode plot of figure 54. The system
amplitude response showed a slight peaking between 0.4 Hz and 5 Hz. The amplitude
response started to roll off at 5 Hz and at 13.5 Hz was -3 dB, and at 40 Hz was -9 dB. The
phase lag was slight at 0.1 Hz, 45* at 6.0 Hz, and 90* at 18 Hz
The system transient response test showed a transition time of 0.7 sec. This transition time
corresponds to an output rate of 0.033 m/sec (1.3 in /sec), which is equivalent to the
control valve saturated flow rate.
Figure 55 shows an X-Y plot of the normal system steady state output position versus input
command. The largest hysteresis loss, 3% (f.s.) occurs near the null position. The hysteresis
losses are attributed to friction, backlash, and system tolerances.
3.4.1.3 Parameter Sensitivity Evaluation
The active/standby and the force summed systems, as described in paragraph 3.4.1.1 were
evaluated as to their sensitivity to certain design parameters.
Both actuator configurations were modeled on an analog computer where specific tests were
conducted to determine the effects of the parameter variations. Frequency response,
transient response, and resolution response tests were conducted. Table 8 presents a
summary of the test procedures used for the testing.
3.4.1.3.1 Active/Standby Test Results.-Table 9 is a list of the study parameters and their
variations. The test data showed the active/standby configuration to be sensitive to certain
parameters. The following discusses the active/standby system sensitivity to the study
parameters. A summary of the most significant data is shown in table 10.
Pressure Gain: The pressure gain parameter, Kp, was varied from 13.8 x 106 Pa/mA to 13.8
x 107 Pa/mA (2000 psi/mA to 20000 psi/mA). The nominal Kp was 6.9 x 107 Pa/mA
(10000 psi/mA). The system performance (frequency response, transient response, and
resolution) was not noticeably affected by these Kp variations.
70
Flow Gain: The flow gain, Kv, was varied from 3.3 x 10-7 m3 . mA/s to 9.9 x 10-7
m3 mA/s (0.02 in 3 * mA/s to 0.06 in 3 . mA/s). The nominal Kv was 6.5 x 10-7 m3. mA/s
(0.04 in 3 * mA/s).
The active/standby system dynamic response showed Kv dependence for small sinusoidal
command signals (±5% F.S.), (fig. 56). The -3 dB cutoff frequency varied from 5 Hz to
10 Hz. The frequency response (for small command signals) is directly related to a change in
Kv since a small sinusoidal command signal does not flow-saturate the control valve. For
larger command signals, where the control valve would become flow saturated, there would
be no Kv dependence.
The active/standby system transient response was not sensitive to Kv variations within the
tested limits.
Active/standby resolution data showed that the system output hysteresis varied from 6%
(f.s.) for a Kv of 3.3 x 10-7 m3 • mA/s (0.02 in3 . mA/s) to 4% (f.s.) to a Kv of 9.9 x 10-7
m3 . mA/s (0.06 in 3 * mA/s) (fig. 57).
Flow Limit: The control valve flow limit, QL was varied from the nominal flow limit of
6.5 x 10-6 m3 /s to 1.6 x 10-5 m3 /s (0.395 in 3/s to 0.955 in3 /s). The actuator transient
response characteristics showed a decrease in response time for an increased QL (fig. 58).
The transition time decreased linearly from 0.7 sec* to 0.3 sec for an equivalent
proportionate increase in QL. No other active/standby performance characteristics were
noticeably affected.
Backlash: The system backlash, B, was varied from the normal backlash of 5.1 x 10-5 m to
2.54 x 10-4 m (0.002 in. to 0.010 in.). The system frequency response (due to ± 5% f.s.
sinusoidal command) data and resolution data showed B dependence. Transient response
tests were not conducted for B variations, because they do not effect the output rate (i.e.,
transition time).
The -3dB cutoff frequency varied from 8.5 Hz to 10.5 Hz for the extreme B values. The 45
phase lag frequency was 3.5 Hz and 1.7 Hz for the same B variation (fig. 59). The amplitude
response data increased in amplitude output as B increased. An explanation is that when the
actuator reached the commanded position, the system inertia coupled with an increased B
allowed the actuator output to overshoot the commanded position. The increased phase lag
as B increased was due to the lost motion. That is, position output would neither start nor
stop moving in the commanded direction until the actuator output traveled the backlash
distance.
Resolution data showed hysteresis losses of 4% (f.s.) and 8% (f.s.) for B equal to
5.1 x 10-5 m and 2.54 x 10-4 m (0.002 in. and 0.010 in.), respectively (fig. 60). This is due
to the lost motion in the output.
*The transition time of 0.7 sec is the time for the system to respond to a 90% command, see table 10.
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Friction: The system friction, F, was varied from 1.8 N to 89 N (0.4 lbf to 20 lbf) with a
nominal F of 1.8 N (0.4 lbf).
System frequency response data showed that the -3 dB cutoff frequency varied from 8.5 Hz
to 3.5 Hz for F equal to 1.8 N and 35.6 N (0.4 lbf and 8 lbf), respectively. The 45*phase lag
frequency varied from 3.5 Hz to 1.5 Hz for those same F values (fig. 61).
Transient response data showed F dependence. The system transition time varied from
0.7 sec* to 1.1 sec for F equal to 1.8 N and 89 N, respectively (fig. 62).
Resolution data showed that the system hysteresis varied from 4% to 12% (f.s.) for the
nominal configuration and F of 89 N (20 lbf), respectively (fig. 63).
For any friction type output load, a certain equivalent input command is required to
generate sufficient actuator output force to overcome the friction restraint and cause the
output to respond (i.e., move). This command level is therefore effectively lost and reflected
as degraded frequency response, degraded transient response, and increased hysteresis loss.
Damping: The damping parameter, D, was varied from 1059 N .s/m to 1750 N s/m
(6 lbf * s/in. to 10 lbf s/in.). The nominal D was 1400 N s/m (8 lbf s/in.). The system
transient response data were not noticeably affected by these D changes. The frequency
response data showed slight D dependence (fig. 64). Resolution tests were not conducted
since D is a velocity dependent parameter and resolution tests are conducted in a manner
to minimize such velocity effects.
Actuator Rod Stiffness: The actuator rod stiffness, Ks was varied from 2.6 x 106 N/m to
4.4 x 106 N/m (15 000 lbf/in. to 25 000 lbf/in.). Variations of Ks only slightly affected the
system frequency response (fig. 65). Transient response and resolution tests were not
conducted for variations of the rod stiffness.
Actuator Dynamic Stiffness: The actuator dynamic stiffness, K, was varied from
1.5 x 106 N/m to 2.4 x 106 N/m (8500 lbf/in. to 13 500 lbf/in.), with a nominal K of
1.9 x 106 N/m (11 000 lbf/in.). None of the system performance characteristics (frequency
response, transient response, and resolution) were sensitive to changes of K.
3.4.1.3.2 Force Summed Test Results.-Table 11 is a list of the study parameters and the
parameter values utilized to determine the force summed performance characteristics. A
summary of the most significant data is shown in table 12. Test data showed the force
summed system to be sensitive to certain parameter variations. These are discussed below.
Flow Gain: The flow gain, Kv, was varied from 3.3 x 10-7 m3 . mA/s to 9.9 x 10-7
m 3 . s/mA (0.02 in 3 * mA/s to 0.06 in 3 - mA/s). The nominal Kv was 6.5 x 10-7 m3 * s/mA
(0.04 in 3 * mA/s. Changes in Ky affected both frequency response and resolution data, but
did not noticeably affect the transient response data.
*Transition time of 0.7 sec is the time for the system to respond to a 90% command, see table 10.
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The -3 dB cutoff frequency varied from 7.5 Hz to 18 Hz (fig. 66) for the extreme Kv values.
The 45 cutoff frequency was 4.0 Hz and 8 Hz for the same extreme Kv values. The
frequency response for small command signals of this system is directly related to a change
in Kv, since a ±5% sinusoidal command signal does not flow-saturate the control valve.
Whenever the control valve is operating in a flow saturated region (i.e., large commands),
there will be no Kv dependence.
Resolution data showed that the system output hysteresis, figure 67, varied from 5% (f.s.)
to 2% (f.s.) for Kv equal to 3.3 x 10-7 m 3 . mA/s and 9.9 x 10-7 m3 mA/s (0.02 in3 . mA/s
and 0.06 in 3 . mA/s, respectively.
Flow Limit: The flow limit, QL, was varied from the nominal QL of 0.65 x 10-5 m 3 /s to
1.6 x 10-5 m 3/s (0.395 in 3 /s to 0.955 in3 /s). Frequency response data showed no QL
sensitivity, because the control valve was not flow saturated for any of the flow limit
testing. The transient response characteristics showed that the actuator transition time*
varied from 0.7 sec to 0.3 sec for QL equal to 0.65 x 10-5 m 3 /s and 1.6 x 10-5 m3/s
(0.395 in 3 /s and 0.955 in 3 /s), respectively.
Backlash: The system backlash, B, was varied from the nominal value 5.1 x 10-5 m to
2.54 x 10-4 m (0.002 in. to 0.010 in.).
The frequency response data showed B dependence (fig. 68). The -3 dB cutoff frequency
varied from 13.5 Hz to 20 Hz for the extreme B values. The 45* cutoff frequency was
6.0 Hz and 3.0 Hz for those same B values. The increased amplitude response may be due to
the system inertia coupled with backlash allowing the actuator to overshoot and cause an
apparent improvement in the amplitude response data. The phase lag degradation with
respect to increased B is due to lost motion.
The force summed system resolution data showed no B dependence (fig. 69). The reason is
that the four channels are force fighting one another in such a way to preload the system,
and effectively eliminate any backlash effects. Thus, the changes that are made in B, would
not be apparent whenever the system was operated in a nearly steady-state mode (i.e.,
during the resolution testing).
Friction: The force summed system friction, F, was varied from 1.8 N to 89 N (0.4 lbf to
20 lbf), with a nominal F of 1.8 N (0.4 lbf). The system performance (frequency response,
transient response, and resolution) showed no F dependency for friction values less than
35.6 N (8 lbf). Frequency response data showed that some performance degradation
occurred for a friction value of 89 N (20 lbf) (fig. 70).
Damping: The damping parameter, D, was varied from 1050 N. s/m to 1750 N. s/m
(6 lbf - s/in. to 10 lbf - s/in.), and the nominal D was 1400 N . s/m (8 lbf s/in.). System
transient response data was only slightly affected by D variations. This slightly-observed
effect was assumed to be within experimental data tolerances.
*The transition time of 0.7 sec is the time for the system to respond to a 90% command, see table 12.
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Actuator Rod Stiffness: The actuator rod spring, Ks, was varied from 2.6 x 106 N/m to
4.4 x 106 N/m (15 000 lbf/in. to 25 000 lbf/in.), with a nominal Ks equal to 3.5 x 106 N/m
(20 000 lbf/in.). Variations of Ks did not noticeably affect the system frequency response.
The rod spring was not varied for either the transient response or the resolution test
procedures.
Actuator Dynamic Stiffness: The actuator dynamic stiffness, K, was varied from
1.5 x !06 N/m to 2.4 x 106 N/m (8500 lbf/in. to 13 500 lbf/in.), with a nominal K of
1.9 x 106 N/m (11 000 lbf/in.). None of the system performance characteristics (frequency
response, transient response, and resolution) were sensitive to the tested K variations.
Voltage Offset: The voltage offset, Av, was varied from 0 (zero) % to ±2.5% of the full
scale command, with a nominal A v of 0%. The system frequency response, transient
response, and resolution tests showed no effect due to Av under normal conditions.
3.4.1.4 Failure Effects Evaluation
Failure tests were conducted on the active/standby and force summed actuator configura-
tions to show how the respective output transients vary due to different failure types (i.e.,
slowover, step, oscillatory, passive, and high gain). For all failure conditions, except for the
slowover failure, the system parameters were kept at their nominal value. The slowover
failure testing was conducted with parameter variations to show this effect on output
performance. The slowover testing was conducted by varying critical design parameters
separately and independently of the others and then introducing a slowover failure. Typical
actuator failure response characteristics are shown on figures 71 through 74.
3.4.1.4.1 Active/Standby Test Results
3.4.1.4.1 Active/Standby Test Results: A block diagram of the active/standby system is
shown in figure 7 to facilitate the discussion of failure types and failure test procedures
peculiar to the active/standby concept. The active/standby system as tested includes a
failure monitoring concept as described in paragraph 3.4.1.1. Although certain oscillatory
failure conditions were detectable as slowovers, no failure logic was implemented
specifically to detect oscillatory failures. The failure monitor system is not an optimized
configuration. However, the configuration is suitable for comparing the relative character-
istics of the two actuator concepts being studied.
Failure Definition and Test Procedure: The following discussion defines the types of
failures and the test procedure used in determining the effects of, and sensitivity to certain
failure conditions.
A slowover failure is an erroneous signal in the form of a ramp input command to one or
more of the six active/standby channels. Tests were conducted by introducing a ramp
command signal into channel Ac (fig. 7). All other channels had no input commands. In
addition to determining the nominal system transient behavior due to a slowover failure,
certain specific design parameters were independently varied to determine the failure
sensitivity to parameter variations.
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An oscillatory failure is an erroneous signal in the form of a periodic input command (e.g.,
sinusoidal) into one or more of the six active/standby channels. To determine the effect of
oscillatory failures, a sinusoidal command was introduced into channel Ac (fig. 7). All other
channels had no input commands.
A step failure is an erroneous signal in the form of a step input command to one or more of
the six active/standby channels. Tests were conducted by introducing a step command signal
into channel Ac (fig. 7). All other channels had no input commands.
A high gain failure is a failure condition caused by an open feedback in one of the six
active/standby channels. Consequently, no output position information is being fed back to
compare (algebraically sum) with the input command, and consequently a very small input
signal would cause the high gain actuator output to fully extend (or retract). Tests were
conducted by opening the feedback path of channel Ac (fig. 7) and introducing a ramp
command into all channels.
A passive failure is a failure condition caused by an open circuit in the input signal path to
one or more of the six active/standby channels. The result is that no input commands are
available to the affected channel. A feedback signal was available as an input error signal.
Tests were conducted by opening the signal path to channel Ac (fig. 7) and introducing a
ramp command into all channels.
Failure Sensitivity-Slowover: Table 13 summarizes the output transient (due to a slowover
failure) sensitivity to parameter variations, as per table 9.
With the exception of Backlash and friction, none of the study parameter variations
noticeably altered the slowover failure output transient of ±5% (f.s.). For Backlash values of
5.1 x 10-5 m and 2.54 x 10-4 m (0.002 in. to 0.010 in.) to failure transient was ±5% and
±8% (f.s.), respectively (fig. 75). Backlash, B, represents mechanical slop in the system.
Thus, whenever a slowover failure is detected, the active channel would become disengaged
and control switched to a standby channel. The output would then be driven to the position
commanded by the activated standby channel. Under these conditions, the system inertia
coupled with backlash would result in an overshoot within the limits of the backlash, Thus,
the greater the backlash, the greater the overshoot.
The most significant output transients were shown to occur whenever a channel failure was
coupled with a position offset of a standby channel (table 14). The reason is that upon
failure, a standby channel becomes active, and the position output will be commanded to a
new null position (i.e., position offset), different from the old null position.
Failure Sensitivity-Oscillatory, Step, High Gain, and Passive: Tables 15 and 16 summarize
the oscillatory, step, and high gain, and passive failure output transient data, respectively. In
general (exceptions were the passive failure and high gain), the output would follow a failure
command up to the failure detection threshold level. At this level, the failure monitor would
disengage the erroneous channel. The output would then move (viz. transient) to the
position commanded by the newly activated standby channel. If either the active channel or
the activated standby channel was offset from the actual (correct) command signal, a larger
(or smaller) output transient could be expected.
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Output transient characteristics were determined for the oscillatory failure condition with
no specific oscillatory failure logic incorporated into the failure monitor system. However,
very low frequency oscillatory failures were detected as a slowover failure. The 0.1 Hz and
1 Hz sinusoidal oscillatory failures of ±10% command level amplitude were detected as
slowover failures. The higher frequency (e.g., 10 Hz) oscillatory failures showed output
transient amplitdaes to he reduced (as compared to lower frequency) because 01 th system
frequency response characteristics (table 15). A channel failure was not detected for the
± 10%, 10 Hz signal because the time delay trip level of the failure monitor was set too long.
That is, the failure detect signal amplitude was greater than the failure threshold for a period
that was shorter than the failure detect time delay.
The output transient characteristics for step failures were predictable. The output transient
for a 1% step (f.s.) and no voltage offsets was about 1.5%. Backlash in the actuator model
affected the output transient amplitude, particularly at the lower level step commands. The
output transient for a 10% step (f.s.) under similar conditions was 10%. Table 16
summarizes the step failure data. When offset commands were introduced among channels,
an asymmetric output transient occurred. The noted asymmetry difference was because the
offset would either add to or subtract from the output transient depending on the sense at
the time of failure detection and switching.
Output transients for the high gain failure ranged from 3% (f.s.) to 10% (f.s.) for conditions
of zero offset and 2.5% offset of the standby channel, respectively (table 17).
The output transients for the passive failure condition ranged from 3% (f.s.) to 8% (f.s.) for
a zero offset and a 2.5% offset of the standby channel, respectively (table 17).
Failure Sensitivity-Performance Degradation: In an active/standby system, the control
channels operate independently with only one channel controlling at a time. There is no
force (or load) sharing among channels, and failure of an active channel causes transfer to a
correctly operating standby channel with no subsequent performance degradation.
3.4.1.4.2 Force Summed Test Results.-A block diagram of the force summed system is
shown in figure 8 to facilitate the discussion of failure types and failure test procedures. The
force summed system, as tested, utilized a failure monitoring system as described in
paragraph 3.4.1.1. Although not optimized, this failure monitoring system is suitable for
comparative evaluation with the active/standby system.
Failure Definition and Test Procedure: The following discussion defines the types of
failures and the test procedure used in determining the effects of, and sensitivity to certain
failure conditions.
A slowover failure is an erroneous signal into one or more of the four force summed channel
(fig. 8). Tests were conducted by introducing a ramp command signal into channel A. All
other channels received only feedback information and consequently these channels
opposed any action by channel A. In addition to determining the transient behavior of the
nominal actuator design due to a slowover failure, certain design parameters, table 11, were
varied to show the system failure sensitivity to parameter variations.
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An oscillatory failure is an erroneous periodic signal (e.g., sinusoidal) into one or more of
the four force summed channels (fig. 8). These tests were conducted by introducing a
sinusoidal command into channel A. All other channels received only feedback information
and consequently these channels opposed any action by channel A.
A step failure is an erroneous signal in the form of a step input command into one or more
of the four force summed channels (fig. 5). Tests were conducted by introducing a step
input into channel A. All other channels received only feedback information and
consequently these channels resisted any action by channel A.
A high gain failure results from an open feedback in one or more of the four force summed
channels. Consequently no position output information is available for (algebraic sum)
comparison with the input command. Thus, a very small input would command the high
gain actuator to fully extend (or retract). Tests were conducted by opening the position
feedback to channel A (fig. 8), then introducing a ramp into all four channels.
A passive failure is caused by opening the input command path to one or more of the four
force summed channels. Tests were conducted by opening the input command path to
channel A (fig. 8) then introducing a ramp into all four channels. As a result, channel A
receives only feedback information and opposes any action of the other three channels.
Failure Sensitivity-Slowover: Table 18 summarizes the slowover failure transients and
transient sensitivity to parameter variations, as per table 11.
Backlash, B, affected the system failure output transient. The output transient varied from
1.8% (f.s.) to 2.4% for B values of 5.1 x 10-5 m to 2.54 x 10-4 m (0.002 in. to 0.010 in.),
figure 76. Whenever the failure was detected as a failure and the respective channel
disengaged, the output rapidly repositioned to the commanded position by the remaining
operable channels. The system inertia coupled with backlash caused the actuator output to
overshoot the commanded position. The amount of overshoot (transient) was dependent on
the amount of backlash.
Increased friction caused a decreased failure transient. Friction absorbed energy from the
system and acted as coulomb damping. Consequently, increased friction caused a decreased
output failure transient.
Failure Sensitivity-Oscillatory, Step, High Gain, and Passive: Tables 19, 20, and 21
summarize the oscillatory, step, high gain, and passive failure output transient data. For
each of the failure conditions, test data showed that the system output tended to follow the
failure command signal at a reduced level because of interchannel force fight.
There was no oscillatory failure logic incorporated into this system. However, very low
frequency oscillatory failures were detected as a slowover failure. The 10 Hz output
transients showed a large amplitude reduction (larger than 0.1 Hz or 1.0 Hz) (table 19)
because of the frequency response characteristics of the system. Position offsets had little
effect on the magnitude of the oscillatory output transients, since no channels disengaged
for the tested oscillatory failure inputs. Furthermore, whenever an oscillatory failure was
introduced into the system with one disengaged channel, the oscillatory output transients
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were of similar magnitude to the transients of a fully operative system. The reason was that
the centering detent spring, which engaged as channel disengagement occurred, provided a
load that opposed the oscillatory failure transient. Thus no increased failure transient with
respect to channel disengagement was produced.
Step failure data (table 20) showed an attenuated position output, because of interchannel
force fight. The ±10% (f.s.) step commands were not large enough to cause channel
disengagement.
High gain failure output transients (table 21) were about 2.3% (f.s.). Any position of voltage
offset caused the high gain actuator to move at the maximum velocity until a channel failure
was detected. The large output transient was due to the finite time delay, which was
incorporated into the failure detection logic.
The passive failure output transient (table 21) ranged to 1.2% (f.s.). The passive channel
tended to resist the actuator commanded movement, since the feedback signal provided a
negative command to the passive channel. The passive failure only prevented an input
command, not a feedback error signal, from controlling the passive channel. Upon channel
disengagement, the resistance due to the passive channel was eliminated and the system
drove toward the commanded position. However, the centering detent force engagement
replaced the resistive force of the disengaged channel. Consequently, the observed output
transient was proportional to the difference between the centering detent force and the
force that was produced by the passive channel failure at the moment of channel
disengagement.
Failure Sensitivity-Performance Degradation: Load sharing is a characteristic of the force
summed system, and the loading on each channel is dependent upon the loading on the
other channels. Consequently, whenever a channel failure and disengagement occurs, the
operable channels must share the load which was previously carried by the disengaged
channel. Furthermore, a centering detent load is engaged upon channel disengagement
which always tends to force the position output toward null (center position). Thus, upon
channel disengagement, the remaining operable channels must also carry the load of the
centering detent. As a result of this load sharing characteristic, system performance
degradation was observable upon channel disengagement.
Table 22 summarizes the observed performance degradation due to channel failures. All
aspects of the system performance (frequency response, transient response, and resolution)
showed degradation.
The system frequency response to a ±5% (f.s.), 0.01 Hz sinusoidal command was used as the
basis for comparing steady state response characteristics following failures. The steady state
output responses was 5%, 4%, and 2.5% for zero, one, and two channel disengagement,
respectively. The -3 dB cutoff frequency also showed degradation (fig. 77).
The system hysteresis losses were 3%, 4%, and 6% (f.s.) for the zero, one, and two channel
disengagement (fig. 78). These three plots also show an output versus input gain reduction
about null for one and two channel failures. The reason for this attenuated output about
null was that the additional system centering detent loads (added as channels are
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disengaged) absorbed some of the system force capability. However, when the actuators
overcame the maximum detent force level, the output to input gain returned to the normal
(no load) gain (fig. 78). Although the gain returned to normal, the output position had been
reduced.
3.4.2 ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
The analytical trade studies compared the two actuator concepts relative to safety
reliability, malfunction reliability, survivability/vulnerability, and system implementation.
The purpose of this study was to compare the two concepts relative to these criteria.
3.4.2.1 Safety/Maintenance Reliability
There are two general reliability requirements that the flight control system and its
actuation components must meet. These are the mean time between noncritical failures and
the mean time between catastrophic failures. The MTBF/noncritical is a maintenance
indicator. The MTBF/catastrophic is an indicator of the overall operational reliability of the
airplane. The MTBF/noncritical, if too short, may cause an unacceptable frequency of
dispatch delays or spending a disproportionate amount of time on maintenance compared to
flying time. The MTBF/catastrophic indicates the probability of safely completing a flight
without catastrophe due to airplane system failures. The general effect of applying
redundancy to a flight control system is to improve the catastrophic MTBF value and
degrade the noncritical MTBF value.
System reliability can be calculated from a success path diagram. Assume a redundant
channel electronic system with perfect channel processor circuitry that always votes out
erroneous electronic signals, monitors electronic failures, and isolates failures from
redundant electronic channels. Also, assume a perfect actuator failure detection and
correction logic circuitry. The success path diagrams for both the active/standby and force
summed configurations could be drawn as shown in figure 79. Let AA be the failure rate of a
single actuator channel which includes the failure rates of all components in the channel
plus hydraulic power. Let Am be the failure rate of-a single monitor (model) channel which
includes the failure rates of all components in that channel.
Active/Standby: In the three-chamel active/standby system, one channel (actuator plus
monitor) is required to ensure a good output or a fail-passive last failure. The reliability of
the system can be calculated as follows. The probability of a channel failing in any one
flight is approximately *Xct where t is flight time. The probability of n channels failing
would be (Act)n; where Ac is the sum of AA and Am. Therefore:
Aactive/standby= (A+Am) 3(t)
Force Summed: In the four-channel force summed system, two operating channels are
required to ensure a good output or a fail-passive last failure. The probability of n channels
failing, as before, would be (Act)n. The probability of the system failing can be computed
*Probability of failure = 1 - e-At and when At is small: 1 - e-At _ At
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by summing the probabilities of all the mutually exclusive ways it could fail. An n channel
system could fail by having any combination of n-l channels fail or by having n channels
fail. The probability of n-I channels failing is ()ct)n-1. There are n mutually exclusive
combinations for having n-I channels of an n channel system fail. Thus, the probability of
an n channel system failing would be:
Xforce summed = n(Xct)n-1 + (c t ) n
since X ct is much smaller than 0.1 for any practical system, a satisfactory approximation is:
Xforce summed = n(Xct)n-
= 4()At) 3
Conclusions: With the above derived probabilities for system failures, and assuming that
XA = Aservo + Ahyd is the same for both concepts, and that Xm = )servo, the following can
be derived:
XA/S = (servo +X hyd + m )3 t3
AFS = 4(servo +  hyd) 3 t 3
Let:
X servo = 25 x 10-6 failures/hour
X hyd = 250 x 10-6 failures/hour
X m = 25 x 10-6 failures/hour
Then the data of table 23 can be calculated. Figure 80 shows the relationship of total
system loss versus duration of flight for both the active/standby and force summed systems.
The number of hydraulic systems used, as well as the failure rate of hydraulic systems
relative to other component failure rates has a significant effect on the reliability results.
The active/standby, three-channel system is assumed to use three hydraulic systems, whereas
the four-channel, force summed system naturally uses four hydraulic systems. This fact, in
itself, tends to reduce the relative reliability of the force summed system, i.e., the
probability of losing any three hydraulic systems out of four is greater than losing all three
out of only three.
During the Boeing/US SST development, it had been established that an "extremely
remote" failure probability classification would be equal to or less than one failure in 109
flight hours. "Extremely remote" failures are those which, although theoretically possible,
would not be expected to occur in the life of an SST fleet.
The reliability calculation of the two actuation concepts of this study are within this range.
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3.4.2.2 Survivability/Vulnerability
Because the entire secondary actuator, cylinders, control valves, and summing mechanism
can be considered vulnerable, it is assumed that protection would be provided to preserve
the integrity of the system in a hostile environment. In-flight damage could result from
gunfire, noncatastrophic midair collision, engine burst, tire burst, etc. Since both actuator
concepts are approximately the same size, the penalty for protection would be about the
same (e.g., if by armor protection).
The vulnerability of hydraulic systems is a significant concern in configurating systems. With
the triple-channel, active/standby system only three hydraulic systems are used; therefore,
only three hydraulic systems are exposed to a common damaging occurrence. Whereas, with
the four-channel, summed system which uses four hydraulic systems, the exposure is greater
and the vulnerability of the total airplane system could be more severe. Due to this
vulnerability, the force summed system is rated less desirable than the active/standby system
in terms of survivability.
3.4.2.3 System Implementation
Producibility.-Both concepts are ranked the same in producibility, i.e., manufacturing and
quality assurance. Although somewhat different, neither concept requires any specialized,
unique hardware or equipment requiring expensive development of special manufacturing
techniques.
Weight.-A weight comparison shows the active/standby actuator system has an advantage
over the force summed system, The major difference is due to the number of actuator
channels required for each concept; three for the active/standby versus four for the force
summed. With a single actuator channel weight of 2.27 kg (5 lb), and an output summing
mechanism weight of 4.54 kg (10 lb) for the force summed and 3.63 kg (8 lb) for the
active/standby, then the following weight summation results:
Total actuator
weight
Active/standby 10.5 kg (23 lb)
Force summed 13.6 kg (30 lb)
Cost.-The cost breakdown for the two concepts is based on a qualitative comparison since
actual costs were not determined. To rate the systems, it is assumed that in the force
summed system, each actuator channel costs a specific amount as does the summing
mechanism. Then, for the active/standby system, since each channel is the same as a force
summed channel, plus a monitor (essentially an electrohydraulic servo valve), each channel
would cost about 1.2 times the amount. The active/Standby output summing mechanism
cost is about 0.75 times the force summing mechanism. Therefore, the following cost
comparison can be calculated.
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Force summed
4X + X = 5X
Summing mechanism
Actuators
Active/standby
3(1.2X) + 0.75X = 4.4X
Summing mechanism
Actuators
Therefore, the active/standby system costs approximately 0.9 of the force summed system.
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-Normal handling qualities
n- - Minimum safe handling qualities
Time, sec
Figure 32.-Summary of Airplane Configuration Characteristics-Landing Approach
- Normal handling qualities
-- Minimum safe handling qualities
Time, sec
Figure 33.-Summary of Airplane Configuration Characteristics-Cruise (M=2.7)
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Figure 34.-Longit dinal Control System Functional Description
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PI LOT TASK
Landing approach and touchdown
Check:
* Pitch SAS on
* Roll SAS off
* Yaw SAS on
* Autothrottle engage
* Noise on
* IAS 144 knots
* Altitude 1800 ft
* IVSI 0 ft/min
Perform the following tasks:
* Maintaining constant altitude, capture localizer
* Flying the localizer, capture glideslope
* After stabilizing on localizer and glideslope, deviate one dot above glideslope and stabilize
* Recapture glideslope
* Continue landing to nose-wheel touchdown.
Figure 35.-Sample Pilot Task Description-Landing Approach
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PILOT TASK
High-speed cruise maneuvering
Check:
* Pitch SAS on
* Roll SAS on
* Yaw SAS on
* Throttles synchronized
* Noise on
* Mach number reading 2.7
* IAS 567 knots
* Altitude 60,000 ft
* IVSI 0 ft/min
Starting from stabilized level flight condition conduct the following: altitude, airspeed, and heading
changes in sequence. Trim airplane for straight and level flight after each maneuver.
Altitude variations:
* Climb to 60,250 ft at 500 ft/min
* Descend to 59,500 ft at 1000 ft/min
* Climb to 60,500 ft at 2000 ft/min
* Descend to 60,000 ft at 500 ft/min
Airspeed variations:
* Increase indicated airspeed to 587 knots
* Decrease indicated airspeed to 547 knots
* Increase indicated airspeed to 567 knots
Heading changes:
* Turn to a heading of 105 degrees - 15 degree bank
* Turn to a heading of 080 degrees - 30 degree bank
Figure 36.-Sample Pilot Task Description-Cruise
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HANDLING QUALITIES RATING SCALE
ADEQUACY FOR SELECTED TASK OR AIRCRA.T DEMANDS ON THE PILOT PILOTREQUIRED OPERATION *  :CHARACTERISTICS IN SELECTED TASK OR REQUIRED OPERATION* RATING
Excellent Pilot compensation not a factor for
Highly desirable desired performance
Good Pilot compensation not a factor for
Negligible deficiencies desired performance
Fair - Some mildly Minimal pilot compensation required for
unpleasant deficiencies desired performance 3
Yes
Minor but annoying Desired performance requires moderate
deficiencies pilot compensation 4
satatory without warrantcies Moderately objectionable Adequate performance requires
improvement? improvement deficiencies considerable pilot compensation 5
Very objectionable but Adequate performance requires extensive
tolerable deficiencies pilot compensation 6
Adequate performance not attainape with
dMajor deficiencies maximum tolerable pilot compensation. 7
Irra o Deficienie aa Controllability not pn question
attainable wth a tolerable reuire Major deficiencies Considerable pilot compensation is requiredpIwopim mprovement eor control 8
Major deficiencies Intense pilot compensation is required toretain control 9
Yes
It o le, No improvement M Control wip s be lost during some portion of:reliable? mandatory Major deficiencies required operation
Pilot decisions Definition of required operation involves designation of flight phase and/ordecisions Cooper-Harrper Ref. NASA TND-5153 subphases with accompanying conditions.
DEFINITIONS FROM TN-D-5153
COMPENSATION PERFORMANCE
The measure of additional pilot effort The precision of control with respect to
and attention required to maintain a aircraft movement that a pilot is able to
given level of performance in the face of achieve in performing a task. (Pilot-
deficient vehicle characteristics. vehicle performance is a measure of
handling performance. Pilot perform-
HANDLING QUALITIES ance is a measure of the manner or
Those qualities or characteristics of an efficiency with which a pilot moves the
aircraft that govern the ease and preci- principal controls in performing a task.)
sion with which a pilot is able to perform
the tasks required in support of an air- ROLE
craft role. The function or purpose that defines the
MISSION primary use of an aircraft.
The composite of pilot-vehicle functions TASK
that must be performed to fulfill opera-
tional requirements. May be specified for The actual work assigned a pilot to be
a role, complete flight, flight phase, or performed in completion of or as repre-
flight subphase. sentative of a designated flight segment.
WORKLOAD
The integrated physical and mental effort required
to perform a specified piloting task.
Figure 37.-Cooper-Harper Rating Scale
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Figure 39.-Active/Standby Configuration 1 Monitor Schematic
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Figure 40.-Active/Standby Configuration ii Monitor Schematic
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Figure 42.-Active/Standby Valve/Monitor Configuration Selection
Failure Transient Summary
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Figure 43.-Active/Standby Valve/Monitor Configuration Selection
Oscillatory Failure Summary
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Figure 46.-Force Summed Valve Configuration Selection Frequency Response
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Figure 48.-Force Summed Valve Configuration Selection, Frequency Response
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Figure 53.-Resolution, Active/Standby, Normal Operation
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Figure 55.-Resolution, Force Summed, Normal Operation
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Figure 56.-Active/Standby Flow Gain Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 57.-Active/Standby, Flow-Gain Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 58.-Active/Standby, Flow Limit Sensitivity, Transient Response
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Figure 59.-Active/Standby, Backlash Sensitivity Frequency Response
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Figure 60.-Active/Standby, Backlash Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 61.-Active/Standby Friction Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 62.-Active/Standby Friction Sensitivity, Transient Response
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Figure 63.-Active/Standby Friction Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 64.-Active/Standby Damping Sensitivity Frequency Response
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Figure 65.-Active/Standby, Rod Spring Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 66.-Force Summed Flow Gain Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 67.-Force Summed Flow Gain Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 68.-Force-Summed Backlash Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 69.-Force Summed Backlash Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 70.-Force-Summed Friction Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 72.-Typical Force Summed Failure Response, Oscillatory
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Figure 75.-Active/Standby Backlash Sensitivity, Failure Response
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Figure 76.-Force Summed, Back/ash Sensitivity, Failure Response
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Figure 77.-Force-Summed Failed Channel Sensitivity, Frequency Response
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Figure 78.-Force Summed Failed Channel Sensitivity, Resolution
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Figure 79.-Reliability Comparison-Success Diagrams
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Table 4.-Summary of FSAA Simulator Testing Procedure
Cruise and landing approach
Failure Handling qualities level
category Normal Min. safe
Step Introduce secondary actuator steps. Increase magnitude until
airplane becomes unflyable.
Slowovers Introduce secondary actuator slowovers. Increase slowover rate until
airplane becomes unflyable.
Oscillations Introduce secondary actuator oscillations. Vary frequency and amplitude.
Map effect on handling qualities.
Control Open command path through secondary actuator momentarily. Vary time
discontinuity increment and map effects on handling qualities.
Cruise and landing approach
Evaluation Handling qualities levels
category Normal Min. safe
Dead band Vary secondary actuator dead band. Map effects on handling qualities.
Hysteresis Vary secondary actuator hysteresis. Map effects on handling qualities.
Threshold Vary secondary actuator threshold. Map effects on handling qualities.
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Table 5.-Summary of Active Standby Valve/Monitor Configuration Selection Tests
Failure Valve/monitor configurations
category Configuration Configuration Configuration
I II III
Slowover Input .25 deg/sec ramp to active channel until failure occurs. Record system response.
High gain Set feedback gain to zero on active channel. Input .25 deg/sec ramp to this channel-record system
response.
Step Shift input null of active channel 1%, 10% and 20% of maximum command - record system response.
Command signal oscillation Oscillatory input to active channel, peak amplitude at 1% and 10% of maximum command signal at
frequencies of 0.1 Hz, 1.0 Hz and 10 Hz respectively.
00
Table 6.-Summary of Force Summed Valve Configuration Selection Tests
Valve pressure gain (Kp) x 10-7 Pa/mA (psi/mA)
Test category 0.138 0.241 0.345 1.379 6.895 13.790
(200) (350) (500) (2000) (10000) (20000)
Frequency response Input sinusoidal command (5% of ecmax to system at the following frequencies: .05; .5; 2.5; 5.; 10.;
15.; 25.; 50. Hz . Measure amplitude ratio and phase shift between output and input at each
frequency.
Transient response Input step command (90% of ecmax). Measure time for system to transition to commanded position.I r pI I I
Resolution Input sinusoidal command to system (90% of e ) at .01 Hz. Record output versus input signal
and measure hysteresis and dead band. max
Rerun tests with valve pressure gains equal to .241 x 107 Pa/mA (350 psi/mA) and 6.895 x 107 Pa/mA (10000 psi/mA) and with one and two
channels failed respectively.
Table 7.-Nominal Actuator Parameters
Symbol Description Value
Kv 1  Servovalve first stage flow gain 1.47 x 10-6 m3 /sec (.09 in3/s)
Kpl Servovalve first stage pressure gain 1.52 x 106 Pa/mA (220 psi/mA)
Kv2 Servovalve second stage flow gain 6.57 x 10-7 m3 /s (.04 in3 /s)
Kp2  Servovalve second stage pressure gain 6.89 x 107 Pa/mA (1 x 104 psi/mA)
K Actuator dynamic stiffness 1.92 x 106 N/m (1.095 x 104 Ibf/in)
(4AP Ksl
Ks1 L + 4A
A Piston area 1.86 x 10 4 m2 (.289 in2 )
Dp Piston damping coefficient 1.4 x 103 N/m (8 Ibf-s/in)
Mp Piston mass 5.95 Kg (.034 lb-s2 /in)
Ff Piston friction 1.78N (.4 Ibf)
Ks1  Actuator backup structural stiffness 1.98 x 106 N/m (1.13 x 104 Ibf/in)
Ks2 Actuator rod stiffness 1.75 x 1011 N/m (1 x 109 lbf/in)
ML Load mass 56 Kg (.32 Ib-s2 /in)
DL Load damping 2.8 x 103 N-s/m (16 Ibf-s/in)
Ka Servo amplifier gain 28.27 mA/V
Kf Position feedback gain 6.12 x 102 V/m (15.54 V/in)
(KF Kdm Kx)
KF Amplifier gain .89 V/V
Kdm Demodulator gain 1.25 V/V
Kx  LVDT gain 5.5 x 102 V/m (14 V/in)
0 Oil bulk modulus 1.03 x 109 N/m 2 (1.5 x 105 Ib/in 2)
L Actuator stroke ±1.27 x 10-2 m (±.5 in)
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Table 8.-Frequency Response, Transient Response, and Resolution Test Procedure
Test Procedure
Frequency response test Input a .01 Hz, +5% sinusoidal command signal into the test configuration. Then measure the
position output and the command signal with a storage oscilloscope. Vary the command signal
frequency and repeat the test procedure. System parameters are varied as per table 9 or table 11
for the active/standby or force summed systems, respectively.
Transient response test Input a ±90% step command signal into the test configuration. Record the input command and
the position output on a strip recorder. Vary system parameters as per table 9 or 11 for the active/
standby or force summed systems, respectively.
Resolution test Input a .01 Hz, +90% sinusoidal command signal into the test configuration. Record the input
command and the position output on an X-Y recorder. Vary system parameters as per tables 9
and 11, for the active/standby or force summed systems, respectively.
Table 9.-Parameter Values Used for Parameter Sensitivity
Analysis, Active/Standby
Parameter Parameter values
First Second Third
Name Symbol Units Nominal variation variation variation
Pressure gain Kp (psi/mA) (10.0 x 103) (2.0 x 103) (20.0 x 103)
Pa/mA 6.9 x 107  1.38 x 107 13.8 x 107
Flow gain Kv  (in3.mA/s) (4.0 x 10-2) (2.0 x 10-2) (6.0 x 10-2) -
m3 .mA/s 6.5 x 10-7  3.3 x 10-7  9.9 x 10 7  -
Flow limit QL (in3 /s) (3.95 x 10-1) (6.75 x 10-1) (9.55 x 10 1)  -
m3 /s 6.5 x 10-6  11.1 x 10-6  16.0x 10-6  -
Backlash B (in) (2.0 x 10-3) (4.0 x 10-3 )  (1.0 x 10-2) -
m 5.1 x 10-5  10.2 x 10-5  25.4 x 105  -
Friction F (Ibf) (0.4) (4.0) (8.0) (20.0)
N 1.8 17.8 35.6 89.0
Damping D (Ibf.s/in) (8.0) (6.0) (10.0) -
N s/m 1.4 x 103  1.05 x 103  1.705 x 103
Rod spring Ks  (lbf/in) (2.0 x 104) (1.5 x 104) (2.5 x 104)
N/m 3.5 x 106  2.6 x 106  4.4 x 106
Dynamic spring K (Ibf/in) (11.0 x 103) (8.5 x 103) (13.5 x 103)
N/m 1.9 x 106  1.5 x 106  2.4 x 106
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Table 10.-Performance Sensitivity to Parameter Variation, Active/Standby ( )
Test Parameter
Test Category Kp Kv  QL B (2) F D Ks  K
Frequency response 8.5 5.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 10.0 7.5 8.5
(-3 dB cutoff, Hz) 8.0 8.5 8.0 9.0 5.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
8.0 10.5 8.0 10.5 3.5 7.5 9.5 8.5
Frequency response 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0
(450 cutoff, Hz) 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
3.2 4.0 3.5 1.7 1.5 3.5 4.0 3.5
Transient response 0.7 0.7 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 - 0.7
(transition time, sec) 0.7 0.7 0.4 - 1.0 0.7 - 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.3 - 1.0 0.7 - 0.7
1.1
Resolution 4.0 6.0 - 4.0 4.0 - - 4.0
(hysteresis loss, 4.0 4.0 - 5.0 7.0 - - 4.0
% of Xmax) 4.0 4.0 - 8.0 8.0 - - 4.0
12.0
Slow Over 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 (3)5.0 5.0 - -
(failure transient, 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 - -
% of Xmax) 5.0 5.0 5.0 8.0 4.5 5.0 - -
(1) The top entry in each box corresponds to the smaller parameter value, the bottom entry
to the largest parameter value.
(2) The 20 Ibf friction data for frequency response was very noisy and was not used for evaluation.
(3) The tested friction values for the slow over tests were 1.8N, 3.6N, and 8.9N (0.4 lbf, 0.8 Ibf,
and 2.0 lbf).
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Table 11.-Parameter Values Used for Parameter Sensitivity
Analysis, Force Summed
Parameter Parameter values
First Second Third
Name Symbol Units Nominal variation variation variation
Pressure gain Kp (psi/mA) (2.2 x 102) (3.5 x 102) (5.0 x 102) -
Pa/mA 1.5 x 106 2.4 x 106 3.4 x 106
Flow gain Kv  (in3 .mA/s) (4.0 x 10-2) (2.0 x 10-2) (6.0 x 10-2) -
m3 .mA/s 6.5 x 10-7  3.3 x 10-7  9.9 x 10-7
Flow limit QL (in3/s) (3.95 x 10-1) (6.75 x 10-1) (9.55 x 10-1) -
m3 /s 6.5 x 10-6 11.1 x 10-6 16.0 x 10-6
Backlash B (in) (2.0 x 10-3) (4.0 x 10-3) (1.0 x 10-2)
m 5.1 x 10-5  10.2 x 10-5  25.4 x 10-5
Friction F (Ibf) (0.4) (4.0) (8.0) (20.0)
N 1.8 17.8 35.6 89.0
Damping D (Ibf-s/in) (8.0) (6.0) (10.0)
N s/m 1.4 x 103  1.05 x 103  1.705 x 103
Rod spring Ks  (Ibf/in) (2.0 x 104) (1.5 x 104) (2.5 x 104) -
N/m 3.5 x 106  2.6 x 106  4.4 x 106 -
Dynamic spring K (Ibf/in) (11.0 x 103) (8.5 x 103) (13.5 x 103)
N/m 1.9 x 106  1.5 x 106  2.4 x 106
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Table 12.-Performance Sensitivity to Parameter Variation, Force Summed 1)
Test Parameters
Test Category Kp Kv  QL B F D Ks  K
Frequency response 14.0 7.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.0 13.0 14.0
(-3 dB cutoff, Hz) 13.5 13.5 14.0 15.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5
13.5 18.0 13.5 20.0 13.5 13.5 13.0 13.5
12.0
Frequency response 6.5 4.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 5.5 6.0
(450 cutoff, Hz) 6.0 6.0 6.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
7.0 8.0 6.0 3.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.5
7.5
Transient response 0.7 0.8 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 - 0.7
(transition time-sec) 0.7 0.7 0.4 - 0.7 0.7 - 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.3 - 0.7 0.7 - 0.7
0.7
Resolution 3.0 5.0 - 3.0 3.0 - - 3.0
(hysteresis loss, 3.0 3.0 - 3.0 3.0 - - 3.0
% of Xmax) 3.0 2.0 - 3.0 3.0 - - 3.0
3.0
Slowover 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 - 1.8
(failure transient, 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.8 - 1.8
% of Xmax) 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.6 1.8 - 1.8
1.6
(1) The top entry in each box corresponds to the smallest of the parameter values, the bottom
entry to the largest parameter value.
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Table 13.-Slowover-Induced Failure Transients, Active/Standby
Failure Transient, % of Xmax
Kp Kv  QL B (1)F D
Nominal parameter 5 5 5 5 5 5
1st deviation 5 5 5 6 5 5
2nd deviation 5 5 5 8 4.5 5
3rd deviation - - - - 5
(1) Friction values for the slowover tests were 1.8N, 3.6N, and 8.9N (0.4 lbf,
.8 Ibf, and 2.0 Ibf).
Table 14.-Slowover-Induced Failure Transients, with Position Offsets, Active/Standby
Failure Transient(1)
Offset the Offset the Offset the
Position active active standby
offset actuator monitor actuator
% of Xmax (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax)
0 5 5 5
1.25 5 6, 3 6, 3
2.5 5 7,2 8,2
(1) Whenever two failure transient values are given, the larger value
represents the failure transient for the actuator driving away
from the position offset, and the smaller value is for the actuator
driving in the direction of the position offset.
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Table 15.-Oscillatory-Induced Failure Transients, Active/Standby
Failure conditions Failure response
Oscillatory Standby chan- Failure Failure
Freq Amp nel offset transient detected
(Hz) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax) (Yes, No)
0.1 10.0 0.0 7.0 Yes (1)
1.0 10.0 0.0 7.0 Yes (1)
10.0 10.0 0.0 ±2.5 No
0.1 10.0 1.25 8.0 Yes (1)
1.0 10.0 1.25 10.0 Yes (1)
10.0 10.0 1.25 £2.5 No
0.1 10.0 2.50 12.0 Yes (1)
1.0 10.0 2.50 12.0 Yes (1)
10.0 10.0 2.50 ± 2.5 No
0.1 1.0 2.50 +1 No
1.0 1.0 2.50 ±1 No
10.0 1.0 2.50 ±.5 No
(1) Low-frequency, large amplitude oscillations are detected as a slow-over
failure.
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Table 16.-Step-Induced Failure Transients, Active/Standby
Standby chan- Failure
Step nel offset transient
(% of Xmax )  (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax )
1 0.0 1.5
10 0.0 10
1 1.25 1.5
10 1.25 11
1 2.5 1
10 2.5 14
Table 17.-High-Gain and Passive Induced Failure Transients, Active/Standby
Standby chan- Failure
Failure nel offset transient
category (% of X max )  (% of Xmax)
High gain 0.0 3
High gain 1.25 7
High gain 2.5 10
Passive 0.0 3
Passive 1.25 6
Passive 2.5 8
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Table 18.-Slowover-Induced Transients, Force Summed
Failure Transient, % of Xmax
Kp Kv  QL B F D K AV
Nominal parameter 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
1st deviation 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8
2nd deviation 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8
3rd deviation - - - - 1.6 - - -
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Table 19.-Oscillatory Failure Induced Transients, Force Summed
Failure conditions Failure response
Oscillatory Position Disengaged Output Failure
offset channels transients detected
Freq Amp
(Hz) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax )  (No.) (% of Xmax )  (Yes, No)
0.1 10.0 0.0 0 .5
1.0 10.0 0.0 0 .5
10.0 10.0 0.0 0 .3
0.1 1.0 0.0 0 0.0
1.0 1.0 0.0 0 0.0
10.0 1.0 0.0 0 .15
0.1 10.0 1.25 0 .5
1.0 10.0 1.25 0 .5
10.0 10.0 1.25 0 .3
0.1 1.0 1.25 0 0.0
1.0 1.0 1.25 0 0.0
10.0 1.0 1.25 0 .15 0
0.1 10.0 2.50 0 .5
1.0 10.0 2.50 0 .5
10.0 10.0 2.50 0 .3
0.1 1.0 2.50 0 0.0
1.0 1.0 2.50 0 0.0
10.0 1.0 2.50 0 .15
0.1 10.0 0.0 1 .5
1.0 10.0 0.0 1 .5
10.0 10.0 0.0 1 .3
0.1 1.0 0.0 1 0.0
1.0 1.0 0.0 1 0.0
10.0 1.0 0.0 1 .15
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Table 20.-Step-Induced Failure Transients, Force Summed
Disengaged Output
Step channels transient (1)
(% of Xmax )  (no.) (% of Xmax)
1 0 .05
10 0 0.6
1 1 0.1
10 1 0.7
(1) No failures detected
Table 21.-High Gain and Passive Failure Induced Transients,
Force Summed
System position Disengaged Output
Failure offset channels transients
category (% of Xmax) (no.) (% of Xmax)
High gain 0 0 2.3
High gain 25 0 -
High gain 0 1 2.3
Passive 0 0 1.0
Passive 25 0 1.0
Passive 0 1 1.2
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Table 22.-Channel-Failure-Induced Performance Degradation, Force Summed
Disengaged Steady state output
channels -3 dB Cutoff Transition time Hysteresis loss 5% command 90% command
(No.) (Hz) (Sec) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax) (% of Xmax)
0 15 .7 3 5 90
1 10 .75 4 4 85
2 9 .85 6 2.5 75
Table 23.-Safety/Maintenance Reliability Comparison
MTBF ( 1 ) (HRS)
Active/standby Force summed
First Total system First Total system
failure loss failure loss
1110 4.115 910 1.339
(x 109) (x 109
(1) MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) Based on 3-Hour Flight
Duration For Total System Loss
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4.0 SECONDARY ACTUATOR DESIGN CRITERIA
The previously discussed results of the analog computer and analytical studies in
combination with the results of the piloted motion simulator study provide the basis to
establish the actuator system's detailed definitions. This section summarizes the major
criteria selection, limitations, and considerations, and establishes preliminary specifications
for the actuator concepts.
4.1 DESIGN CRITERIA SELECTION
A summary of the allowable failure transients and actuator system failure transient
characteristics is shown in table 24. The allowable transients are shown for a first failure
condition and for a second failure condition. Both failure conditions are shown for a landing
approach flight configuration and a high speed cruise flight configuration. This summary
contains only one set of characteristics for the active/standby system, since there are no
changes in performance following a failure switchover to a standby channel. For the force
summed system, however, there are changes in performance as a channel failure occurs.
Therefore, two sets of failure capability data are shown for the force summed system; one
with four channels operating and one with three channels operating.
The allowable failure transients were established from the FSAA simulation testing. These
tests are summarized in paragraph 2.3. The failure transient characteristics of the
active/standby and force summed systems were determined from the analog computer
study. The analog study results are summarized in paragraph 2.4.
No oscillatory failure monitoring system was incorporated in either of the two actuator
system models evaluated. Therefore, as shown on the summary table (table 24), neither the
active/standby nor the force summed system satisfies the oscillatory allowable failure
transients.
The force summed actuator system satisfies the maximum allowable transients for all failure
modes except the oscillatory failures.
The active/standby actuator system satisfies the maximum allowable transients for all failure
modes except the step and oscillatory failures. In summary, the force summed system has
the capability to satisfy the SST piloted requirements, with exception of the oscillatory
transients. Whereas, the active/standby system tested has poorer failure transient perform-
ance as compared to the force summed system and does not totally satisfy the SST
maximum allowable transients. The development of an improved failure monitor system
would be required for the active/standby system to be competitive with the force summed
system.
Additional failure transient capability is needed in both concepts to detect oscillatory
failures.
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4.2 DESIGN CRITERIA CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Design criteria for the active/standby and force summed secondary actuator concepts were
primarily based on the FSAA simulator test results. This simulator study evaluated the
Boeing 2707-300 airplane, flown in a manual control mode. The test results are therefore
typical for this airplane and its control systems.
Although criteria sensitivity to airplane model variations has not been established in this
study, the criteria presented in this document are considered an appropriate base for other
AST airplane configurations flown in a manual control mode.
When selecting design criteria for a secondary actuator application, consideration must begiven to all requirements. In addition to the manual mode of operation, a typical transport
type airplane will be equipped with an autopilot, an autoland system, and most likely in the
case of an AST, some type of structural mode suppression system. Any, or all, of these
systems can impose stringent requirements on the control system characteristics. The
requirements of these automatic control functions are not defined in this document.
4.3 SECONDARY ACTUATOR DESIGN SPECIFICATION
Preliminary detailed actuator design definition for both the active/standby and force
summed secondary actuator systems are included in tables 25 and 26. The criteria are based
on the nominal baseline design parameters used in the study, modified consistent with the
conclusions of this study.
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Table 24.-Failure Transient Criteria/Capability Summary
Maximum Actuator system
allowable transient (1) transient capability (% Xmax)Failure
criteria Force summed
1st failure 2nd failure Active/
standby 1st failure 2nd failure
Step 12/5 38/18 10 .6 .7
High gain 12/5 38/18 3 2.3 2.3
Passive 12/5 38/18 3 1 1..2
Oscillatory (0.1 Hz) 0 0 7 .5 .5
Oscillatory (1 Hz) 8.5/1.5 27/- 8 .5 .5
Oscillatory (10 Hz) - - 2.5 .3 .3
Switch delay 1 sec 3.65 sec - -
Slowover - 5 1.8 1.8
(1) Landing approach/high speed cruise
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Table 25.-Active/Standby Actuator Design Specification
Unit criteria S.I. Units (U.S. Units)
Number of actuator channels 3 (3)
Piston area 1.9 x 10-4 m2  (.294 in2)
Rated velocity 6.6 x 10-2 m/s (2.6 in/s)
Force output/channel 4000 (900 Ibf)
Open loop gain 60 sec-1 (60 sec " )
Maximum damping/channel 1400 N-s/m (8 Ibf-s/in)
Maximum friction/channel 1.8 N (.4 lbf)
Resolution 2% (2%)
Threshold 0.1% (0.1%)
Linearity ±2% (±2%)
Weight 10.4 Kg (23 Ib)
Total piston stroke 5.08 x 10-2 m (2 in)
Actuator Valve
Rated input voltage (max) 25 v (25 v)
Flow gain 6.6 x 10-7 m3 -mA/s (.04 in3-mA/s)
Pressure gain 6.9 x 107 Pa/mA (104 psi/mA)
Monitor Valve
Rated input voltage (max) 25 v (25 v)
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Table 26.-Force Summed Actuator Design Specification
Unit Criteria S.I. Units (U.S. Units)
Number of actuator channels 4 (4)
Piston area 1.9 x 10-4 m2  (.294 in2
Rated velocity 6.6 x 10-2 m/s (2.6 in/s)
Force output/channel 1335 (300 lbf)
Open loop gain 60 sec-1 (60 sec-1)
Maximum damping /channel 1400 N-s/m (8 Ibf-s/in)
Maximum friction/channel 1.8 N (.4 lbf)
Resolution 2% (2%)
Threshold 0.1% (0.1%)
Linearity ±2% (±2%)
Weight 13.6 Kg (30 Ib)
Total piston stroke 5.08 x 10-2 m (2 in)
Actuator Valve
Rated input voltage 25 v (25 v)
Flow gain 6.6 x 10-7 m3 -mA/s (.04 in3 -mA/s)
Pressure gain 1.52 x 106 Pa/mA (220 psi/mA)
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5.0 ACTUATION CONCEPT APPLICABILITY
The previously discussed study results provide the basis to judge and to establish the
applicability and practicality for using the two actuator concepts in an AST and other type
aircraft control systems.
5.1 APPLICABILITY OF ACTUATOR CONCEPTS TO AST CONTROL SYSTEMS
AST airplanes will operate throughout a large speed and altitude range. Unstable
configurations in the subsonic speed range will more than likely prevail. At higher
supersonic speeds stability would increase. To operate these airplanes economically, stability
margins must be selected such that flight-critical augmentation systems are required for
safety of flight. Other characteristics of an AST affecting control system performance
requirements are structural flexibility and control sensitivity at cruise.
The requirements on AST control system performance are great. Phase and gain
characteristics must be rigorously controlled throughout the frequency spectrum within
which these systems are to operate. Secondary servos will be used as intermediate signal
conversion stages in augmentation systems as well as in other automatic control systems.
Phase and gain variations in the secondary actuators must be held to a minimum by
judiciously selecting linear actuator parameters and by minimizing nonlinear effects. Due to
the high control effectivenss at cruise, failure transients due to channel failures must be
minimized to avoid catastrophic upsets. As these augmentation systems are flight critical,
system reliability must approach that of the airplane structure.
The comparison of the two secondary actuator concepts in section 2.0 indicates that the
force summed concept meets performance requirements better than the active/standby
concept. However, the active/standby is superior in meeting reliability requirements. Based
on these observations the force summed secondary actuator system would be the most
likely candidate for an AST application.
5.2 APPLICABILITY OF ACTUATOR CONCEPTS TO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN AST
Conventional subsonic transport airplanes are normally stable vehicles that do not require
stability augmentation other than to complement flying qualities characteristics. Secondary
actuators are used in these types of aircraft in yaw damper and autopilot systems. Both of
these system types operate in the low frequency ranges of rigid airplane dynamics.
Frequency response requirements for these systems are relatively low. Control surface
sensitivity on subsonic aircraft is normally low as compared to that of an AST, especially at
cruise. With this low sensitivity, normal surface travel is relatively large. This, and the
inherent stability of the airplane, require less stringent performance capabilities. Also, due
to the reduced control surface sensitivity, upsets due to control system failure modes will be
less severe than would the case for the AST.
For these reasons, more emphasis will be placed on characteristics such as maintainability
and cost than on high performance when selecting a secondary actuator concept for this
type of airplane. The comparison of the active/standby and force summed systems made in
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section 2.4, indicates that the active/standby system is superior in this respect. If, however,
selections are to be made for subsonic advanced technology transports, the requirements on
performance might well be as stringent as those for an AST.
A number of advanced technology augmentation systems are being considered. Examples
are stability augmentation of airplane with relaxed static stability, load alleviation and mode
suppression. All these control systems are augmenting marginally stable and unstable
dynamics in an extended frequency spectrum. Therefore, the performance and reliability
requirements may again become paramount. In the evaluation of the two concepts, the
force summed system has the better performance and would be the most likely choice for
an advanced technology airplane.
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